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THE PREFERRED PREFERENCES IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW*
EMILY GOLD WALDMAN**
In theory, customer preferences cannot justify discriminatory
treatment by employers. The reality is more complicated. Built
into the structure of federal employment discrimination law are
several openings for customer preferences to provide employer
defenses to what would otherwise likely be actionable
discrimination.
This Article explores when and which customer preferences can
enter those openings. It focuses on what I deem the “preferred
preferences”: the customer preferences that have formed the basis
of successful employer defenses to discrimination claims. This
Article identifies and evaluates six such preferences: (1) aesthetic
appeal; (2) physical privacy from employees of the opposite sex;
(3) psychological comfort/affinity with employees of the same
sex; (4) an English-only environment; (5) avoidance of
proselytization or judgment; and (6) convenience. This Article
also analyzes a potential seventh preferred preference—
diversity—that courts have yet to consider.
The Article shows that each individual preferred preference is not
just a one-off exception to the supposed irrelevance of customer
preferences but part of a collective body of doctrine that operates
according to its own principles. Although courts are not explicit
about this, these preferences intuitively strike courts as
reasonable and natural, both because they do not seem
invidiously discriminatory and because they align with ingrained
social conventions and norms. As a result, courts (1) consider
them weightier than “mere preferences” and/or (2) view
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compliance with them as imposing only a minor burden on
employees. The more that these two factors are satisfied, the
more preference deference we see.
But courts are not striking the right balance in their preference
deference. This largely stems from the tension between the claim
that customer preferences are irrelevant in antidiscrimination law
and the reality that they sometimes do count. To reconcile this
dissonance, courts elevate the preferred preferences into virtual
needs or minimize how much they burden employees. In the
process, biases and inconsistencies sneak in. This Article
illuminates how this occurs and then argues that a reordering of
the current preference hierarchy is in order.
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INTRODUCTION
A basic tenet of employment discrimination law is that customer
preferences generally cannot justify discriminatory treatment by
employers.1 As one court recently put it, “[c]ourts have consistently
held that, in the employment law context, client or consumer
preference cannot cleanse an employer’s actions—even when the
employer claims to have acted free of bias.”2 Otherwise, the
antidiscrimination mandates would lack any teeth.
Built into the structure of federal employment discrimination
law, however, are several openings for customer preferences to
provide employer defenses to what would otherwise likely be
actionable discrimination. These include:
•

The bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”)
defense to intentional discrimination based on sex,
religion, national origin, and age;3

•

The “business necessity” defense to disparate impact
claims;4 and

1. Turner v. Parker Sec. & Investigative Servs., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-113(WLS), 2014
WL 5819929, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2014) (“‘Customer preference’ is not a legitimate
defense under Title VII.” (citing Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d
902, 905 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990); and then citing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d
385, 388–89 (5th 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971))); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (noting that “the federal courts have agreed that it is
impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the basis of
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes”); Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612
F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It is now widely accepted that a company’s desire to cater
to the perceived racial preferences of its customers is not a defense under Title VII for
treating employees differently based on race.” (internal citations omitted)); Rucker v.
Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Customer preference has
repeatedly been rejected as a justification for discrimination against women.” (citing
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981))).
2. Sparenberg v. Eagle All., Civil No. JFM-14-1667, 2015 WL 6122809, at *6 (D. Md.
Oct. 15, 2015) (internal citations omitted); see also Chaney, 612 F.3d at 913; Rucker, 669
F.2d at 1181; cf. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333–34 (agreeing with the view that the BFOQ
defense “provides only the narrowest of exceptions to the general rule requiring equality
of employment opportunities”).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
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The requirement that employers accommodate the
religious practices and disabilities of their employees
only when the requested accommodations are
“reasonable” and do not impose an “undue hardship.”5

This Article explores when and which customer preferences can
successfully enter these openings. For example, in what circumstances
can a customer preference for same-sex service create a BFOQ for a
job? If an employer’s facially neutral appearance policy responds to a
strong customer preference, is that enough to make it “consistent with
business necessity,”6 notwithstanding its disparate impact as to a
protected characteristic like race? And if an accommodation for a
religious employee will offend customers, does that count as imposing
an undue hardship, thereby removing the employer’s obligation to
provide it?
Although each customer preference opening has received much
scholarly attention,7 they are less often considered together. This
5. For discrimination based on religion, this requirement stems from the
combination of Title VII’s definition of “religion” including “all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business,” id. § 2000e(j), and its provision that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion,” id.
§ 2000e-2(a). For discrimination based on disability, this requirement stems from the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
6. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
7. On the BFOQ opening, see generally Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title
VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977); Kimberly
A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex
Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147 (2004); Rachel L. Cantor, Comment, Consumer
Preferences for Sex and Title VII: Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating
BFOQ Defenses, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 493 (1999). On the job-related and business
necessity opening, see generally Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387 (1996); Andrew C.
Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of
Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996). On the reasonable
accommodation/undue hardship opening, see generally Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1
(1996); James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering
Reasonable Accommodation, 6 J. CONST. L. 525 (2004); Alan D. Schuchman, Note, The
Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination of the Different Applications of the
Reasonable-Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73 IND. L.J. 745 (1998).
For a recent article discussing the BFOQ and business necessity openings, see generally
Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for Non-Employee Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV.
1169 (2017). Relatedly, for discussions concerning employers’ reliance on unfavorable
customer feedback, see Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring

97 N.C. L. REV. 91 (2018)

2018]

PREFERRED PREFERENCES

95

Article provides that collective examination. It offers a descriptive
and normative analysis of how customer preferences fit into
employment discrimination law, focusing on what I deem the
“preferred preferences.” These are the customer preferences that,
notwithstanding the general presumption to the contrary, have
successfully provided the basis of employer defenses to discrimination
claims. This Article identifies six such preferred preferences: (1)
aesthetic appeal; (2) physical privacy from employees of the opposite
sex; (3) psychological comfort/affinity with employees of the same
sex; (4) an English-only environment; (5) avoidance of proselytization
or judgment; and (6) convenience. I also discuss a possible seventh
preferred preference—diversity—which is being increasingly
expressed by customers, but about which there is scant case law so
far. As this Article will show, even though these preferences seem
widely disparate, they are actually linked by some common threads
that lead to their “preferred” status.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I of the Article
canvasses employment discrimination law to describe the four key
openings where customer preferences can be taken into account. This
list includes the three explicit statutory defenses within which
customer preferences can be considered, plus a more subtle way—the
judicially created equal burdens doctrine—that such preferences can
influence courts’ assessments of whether unlawful discrimination has
occurred in the first place. For each opening, the Article discusses
which specific preferences have successfully taken hold.
Part II then cuts across these different domains to provide an
overarching taxonomy of the preferred preferences themselves.
Although some of these preferences (like an English-only
environment and the desire to avoid proselytization) only show up in
a single opening, others (such as aesthetic appeal and convenience)
appear in multiple openings. This Part evaluates the relative success
of the preferred preferences, ranking them each as strongly,
moderately, or weakly preferred. The strongly preferred preferences
are those to which courts frequently defer; the moderately preferred
preferences are those to which courts sometimes defer; and the
weakly preferred preferences are those to which courts occasionally
defer.

Biased Customer Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2169–73
(2018); Lu-in Wang, When the Customer is King: Employment Discrimination as Customer
Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 249, 270–76 (2016).
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Moreover, this Part explores what is special about this collection
of preferences—i.e., when and why they garner more deference. It
argues that although courts are not explicit about this, these
preferences intuitively strike courts as reasonable and natural, both
because they do not seem invidiously discriminatory and because they
align with ingrained social conventions and norms. As a result, courts
(1) consider them weightier than “mere preferences” and/or (2) view
compliance with them as imposing only a minor burden on
employees. The more that these two factors are satisfied, the more
preference deference we see.
Finally, Part III argues that courts are not striking the right
balance in their preference deference. This largely stems from the
tension between the claim that customer preferences are irrelevant in
antidiscrimination law and the reality that they sometimes do count.
In order to reconcile this dissonance, courts elevate the preferred
preferences into virtual needs or minimize how much they burden
employees. In the process, biases and inconsistencies sneak in. Courts
should begin by acknowledging that all of these preferences are
indeed preferences rather than virtual necessities. Moreover, courts
should heighten their awareness of how policies responding to these
preferences can impose differential burdens—particularly with
respect to the protected characteristics of sex, race, national origin,
and religion—on employees.
That does not mean, however, that all customer preferences
should be held invalid in the context of antidiscrimination claims. On
the contrary, I argue that it is still sometimes appropriate to take such
preferences into account when considering whether actionable
discrimination has occurred. But we need clearer standards for when
to do so. Although the particular formulation will vary depending on
the specific opening and preference, this Article proposes two
important guideposts in analyzing these issues: (1) a context-specific
look at whether the preference relates to the employee’s actual
performance of the specific job and (2) a broad look at the extent to
which the preference limits equal employment opportunity in the
workplace. Applying these principles, I suggest a reordering of the
current preference hierarchy is in order. In particular, the aesthetic
appeal and English-speaking environment preferences receive too
much deference, while the same-sex psychological comfort preference
receives too little deference.
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I. THE CUSTOMER PREFERENCE OPENINGS: AN OVERVIEW
Federal employment antidiscrimination law includes three major
statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”),8 which
addresses discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”);9 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).10
Underlying these laws are three basic models of employment
discrimination: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to
provide reasonable accommodation.11 Within each of these laws, and
within each of these models, are openings for customer preferences to
enter the analysis. Specifically, as discussed below, there are two
openings in the disparate treatment model (the BFOQ defense and
the equal burdens doctrine),12 one opening in the disparate impact
model (the business necessity defense),13 and one opening in the
failure-to-accommodate model (the undue hardship defense).14 This
Article primarily focuses on Title VII, under which most of the
customer preference cases arise.
A. The Disparate Treatment Openings: The BFOQ Defense and the
Equal Burdens Doctrine
The first model of discrimination is known as disparate
treatment—i.e., treating employees differently on the basis of a
protected characteristic. The disparate treatment model is a central
part of all three federal antidiscrimination statutes. Title VII explicitly
prohibits such differential treatment when it is based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.15 The ADEA prohibits differential
treatment based on age, provided that the employee in question is at
least forty.16 Finally, the ADA prohibits differential treatment toward
a “qualified individual on the basis of disability.”17
Within the disparate treatment model, there are two key
openings through which customer preference can enter. First, Title
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
11. See, e.g., William L. Corbett, Proving and Defending Employment Discrimination
Claims, 47 MONT. L. REV. 217, 218 (1986); Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex
Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 900 (2014).
12. See infra Section I.A.
13. See infra Section I.B.
14. See infra Section I.C.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (2012).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
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VII and the ADEA both include an explicit BFOQ defense to
disparate treatment. Title VII states that disparate treatment on the
basis of religion, sex, or national origin is permissible “in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise.”18 The ADEA
includes a parallel BFOQ for age discrimination.19 Thus, if a customer
preference for employees of a certain religion, sex, national origin, or
age rises to the level of a BFOQ, that preference can provide the
basis for a successful employer defense.
Second, sometimes customer preferences play a role in
determining whether something counts as disparate treatment at all.
Here, technically speaking, the preferences do not serve as a defense
but rather influence whether the court thinks actionable
discrimination has occurred in the first place. The most explicit
example of this phenomenon is the judicially created equal burdens
doctrine for Title VII challenges to sex-differentiated appearance
policies.20
Both of these openings are discussed in detail below.
1. The BFOQ Opening
The BFOQ defense is probably the clearest customer preference
opening within employment discrimination law. In fact, although the
legislative history on the BFOQ is sparse, it suggests that Congress
indeed had customer preferences in mind when it enacted the BFOQ
defense. Even before sex was added as a protected characteristic
under Title VII, the BFOQ defense had already been included for
religious and national origin discrimination, but not discrimination
based on race or color.21 Once Title VII’s list of protected
characteristics was expanded to include sex during the House’s final
stage of deliberations, Representative Charles Goodell proposed a
parallel expansion of the BFOQ defense to include sex.22 He framed
his argument explicitly in terms of customer preferences, stating:
“There are so many instances where the matter of sex is a bona fide

18. Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2012).
20. See infra Section I.A.2.
21. See Sirota, supra note 7, at 1027–31 (providing a detailed history of the events
leading up to the BFOQ’s inclusion in Title VII).
22. Id. at 1028; see also 110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964).
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occupational qualification. For instance, I think of the elderly woman
who wants a female nurse.”23
Similarly, in the Senate, an interpretive memorandum described
the BFOQ defense as authorizing “legitimate discrimination,”24 such
as “the preference of a business which seeks the patronage of . . .
particular religious groups for a salesman of that religion.”25 The clear
implication was that customers of a particular religious group would
prefer a salesperson of the same religion and that the employer
should be free to satisfy that “legitimate” preference.
But courts have not interpreted the BFOQ opening for customer
preferences to be as big as the legislative history might suggest. On
the contrary, courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that most
customer preferences for employees of a certain age, religion,
national origin, or sex can give rise to valid BFOQs. This issue has
arisen most frequently with sex discrimination claims, where courts
have consistently rejected sex-based preferences that stem from
stereotypical or chauvinistic conceptions of women.
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,26 for example, Pan
American (“Pan Am”) argued that female sex was a BFOQ for being
a flight attendant,27 and the trial court found that “passengers
overwhelmingly preferred to be served by female stewardesses.”28
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that “it would be
totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices
of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was
valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the [Civil
Rights Act of 1964] was meant to overcome.”29 The court thus
concluded that a successful BFOQ defense requires a showing that
“the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not
hiring members of one sex exclusively.”30 Because the essence of Pan
Am’s business was “to transport passengers safely from one point to
another,” sex could not be considered a BFOQ.31
A subsequent district court decision rejected Southwest Airlines’
claim that, because it had branded itself as the “love” airline, the
essence of its business operation would be undermined by hiring men
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964) (statement of Rep. Goodell).
110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
Id.
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
See id. at 386.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 388.
See id. at 388–89.
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for ticket sales and flight attendant positions.32 “[S]ex does not
become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit
female sexuality as a marketing tool,”33 the court explained,
contrasting Southwest Airlines’ flight attendant positions to “jobs
where sex or vicarious sexual recreation is the primary service
provided, e. g. a social escort or topless dancer . . . [where] the
employee’s sex and the service provided are inseparable.”34
Just as courts have held that chauvinistic customer preferences
cannot give rise to BFOQs that favor women, they have also held that
such preferences cannot establish BFOQs that exclude women. In
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.,35 for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the argument that being male was a BFOQ for a high-level corporate
position because of the employer’s concern that Latin American
clients would react negatively to a female vice president.36 The court
stated that “stereotypic impressions of male and female roles do not
qualify gender as a BFOQ.”37 Similarly, a Virginia district court
explained that a sports club could not cater to customer preferences
for a “male macho image” by only hiring men for its athletic director
position.38
There are two customer preferences, however, that have
repeatedly entered the BFOQ opening to create a sex-based BFOQ.39
32. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
33. Id. at 303.
34. Id. at 301. Indeed, as Yuracko explains, courts generally distinguish between a
business that “is selling sex only” and a business that “is selling something else plus sex.”
Yuracko, supra note 7, at 212–13. These situations fall along a “sexual-titillation
continuum”: the more that the job involves providing sexual gratification itself, such as
being a prostitute, lap dancer, or nude centerfold model, the more likely sex—either male
or female, as applicable—is held to be a BFOQ. Id. at 157. By contrast, when the
employer sells something other than sex and simply uses sex appeal for marketing, courts
generally reject the BFOQ argument. Id. at 158. Yuracko has also noted that the Hooters
restaurant chain seems to be maintaining its policy of only hiring women as food servers
by settling sex discrimination lawsuits rather than going to court. KIMBERLY A.
YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW 127 (2016). That said, sometimes
particular sex appeal preferences, such as for female employees to present themselves in
traditionally feminine ways as to their hair, makeup, and dress, end up taking hold through
the equal burdens doctrine that is discussed below. See infra Section I.A.2.
35. 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
36. See id. at 1274, 1276.
37. Id. at 1276 (citing City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 (1978); and then citing Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980)).
38. Morris v. Bianchini, Civ. A. No. 86-0742-A, 1987 WL 11822, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb.
24, 1987), aff’d, 838 F.2d 467 (4th Cir. 1988) (unpublished table decision).
39. In saying that these preferences can successfully provide the basis for a sex
BFOQ, I mean that, at a minimum, courts allow these preferences to be presented to
juries as part of a BFOQ defense. In numerous cases discussed herein, courts went even
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These preferences are sometimes referred to under the umbrella term
of “privacy,” but they can be usefully divided into two categories: (1)
a preference for same-sex service that stems from customers’ interest
in physical privacy from employees of the opposite sex and (2) a
preference for same-sex service that stems from customers’ sense of
psychological comfort/affinity with employees of the same sex. These
two interests are closely related—and can often be implicated in the
same job—but they are distinct.
a.

Physical Privacy from the Opposite Sex

Numerous courts have held that preferences related to physical
privacy—specifically customers’ desires not to have their nude bodies
seen and/or touched by the opposite sex—can justify a sex-based
BFOQ.40 Courts are most deferential when the job involves not just
seeing customers’ naked bodies but actually touching them. As one
court explained when holding that female sex was a BFOQ for
nursing positions that involved intimate care to elderly women,41 the
job responsibilities involved “intimate personal care including
dressing, bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes and catheter
care. Each of these functions involves a personal touching as to which
each guest is privileged by law to discriminate on any basis.”42
further, granting summary judgment to the employer on grounds that it had indisputably
made out the BFOQ defense. By contrast, the disfavored preferences get rejected at
summary judgment.
40. See, e.g., Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1423 (N.D. Ill.
1984); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80-1374-W, 1982 WL 3108, at *5 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 2, 1982); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195–96 (E.D. Ark. 1981),
vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (unpublished table
decision).
41. Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1354.
42. Id. at 1352–53. Note that this reasoning could theoretically be extended to race as
well. Title VII does not have a race-based BFOQ, however, and at least one court has held
that it would violate Title VII for a hospital or other employer to comply with a patient
request for only white nurses. See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913
(7th Cir. 2010). Kimani Paul-Emile has nonetheless noted that, in practice, requests for
physicians of a particular race are sometimes made and accommodated, “most often . . .
when made by racial minority patients.” Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients’ Racial Preferences
and the Medical Culture of Accommodation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 462, 464, 500 (2012). PaulEmile further argues in support of such accommodations, pointing to empirical data
indicating “that permitting hospitals to accede to their patients’ racial preferences may not
only alleviate race-based health disparities but also constitute a life-saving measure for
many racial-minority patients.” Id. at 467. As Paul-Emile states, no courts have so ruled—
which is why this preference is not included among the Article’s list of currently preferred
preferences. See id. at 483.
That said, a major new working paper from the National Bureau of Economic
Research provides strong empirical evidence for the claim that African American male
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Relatedly, courts are sympathetic to the emotional discomfort
customers/patients may experience if their sense of physical privacy is
infringed upon. For example, in the labor nurse context, one district
court wrote:
[I]t is important that the birth experience not only be positive
but also without stress. . . . [D]ue to the sensitive and intimate
duties performed by staff nurses in this area, there is a factual
basis for determining that the employment of male nurses in the
labor and delivery area would cause medically undesired
tension.43
More recently, a Tennessee district court relied on the BFOQ defense
to uphold the Transportation Security Administration’s (“TSA”)
policy of requiring at least 33% of its screeners to be women so that
there would always be a same-sex screener to conduct pat-down
searches at the airport.44 Even the Supreme Court has nodded to the
validity of the physical privacy BFOQ, although it has not explicitly
addressed the issue.45
In the few physical privacy cases that have actually gone to trial,
as opposed to being decided in the employer’s favor on summary
judgment, it was typically because there was a factual question about
whether there were other ways for the employer to accommodate the
physical privacy preference. But the basic validity of the preference
itself is accepted as a given. In Little Forest Medical Center of Akron
patients could have better medical outcomes when seen by African American male
physicians, as opposed to when they are seen by male physicians of other ethnicities. See
Marcella Alsan, Owen Garrick & Grant C. Graziani, Does Diversity Matter for Health?
Experimental Evidence from Oakland 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 24787, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24787 [https://perma.cc/Q9HT-C54U]. The
researchers calculated that “black doctors would reduce mortality from cardiovascular
disease by 16 deaths per 100,000 per year, accounting for 19% of the black-white gap in
cardiovascular mortality.” Id. at 6 (citations omitted). They did not attribute this result to
discrimination but to better patient-doctor communication, explaining “subjects were 10
percentage points (29%) more likely to talk with black male doctors about other health
problems. Black doctors were 11 percentage points (35%) more likely to write notes about
black patients than non-black doctors.” Id. at 4. If and when additional support for these
results emerge, it is possible that there will be a judicial or legislative response that makes
room for this preference within employment discrimination law.
43. Mercy Health Ctr., 1982 WL 3108, at *5; see also Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1195–96
(holding that female sex is a BFOQ for being a labor nurse).
44. Wade v. Napolitano, No. 3-07-0892, 2009 WL 9071049, at *9–10 (M.D. Tenn. Mar.
24, 2009).
45. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991) (stating that
“[n]othing in our discussion of the ‘essence of the business test’ . . . suggests that sex could
not constitute a BFOQ when privacy interests are implicated” (citing Backus, 510 F. Supp.
at 1195–96)).
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v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission,46 for instance, the court held that a
trial was appropriate because, despite the defendant nursing home’s
argument that female sex was a BFOQ for nursing aide positions, it
was possible that the nursing home could instead accommodate its
residents’ preferences by hiring both males and females for the
positions and then “assigning male nurse’s aides to male residents and
non-objecting female residents and female nurse’s aides to female and
non-objecting male residents.”47
Interestingly, some of the physical privacy cases implicate a
supplementary customer preference as well: convenience. For
example, in upholding the TSA’s policy of requiring at least 33% of
its screeners to be women, the Wade court indicated that it would not
be feasible to have a more skewed ratio because that would result in
unacceptable wait times.48 Indeed, courts have indicated that
convenience is also a legitimate preference that should enter the
analysis—i.e., that employers should have room to accommodate
customers’ physical privacy preferences in ways that do not overly
inconvenience customers.49 This means that the convenience
preference can end up working with the physical privacy preference
to create a BFOQ because there are situations where the only way to
simultaneously satisfy both preferences is to hire an employee of a
particular sex for the position.

46. 575 N.E.2d 1164 (Ohio 1991).
47. Id. at 1171. Similarly, in EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1993), the
district court held that a jury trial was required as to whether female sex was a BFOQ for
jobs in an all-female gym that would involve taking prospective members through tours of
the locker room and taking their measurements. Id. at 1293 & n.2, 1296. The EEOC had
pointed to alternatives like “allowing females to assist clients who object to being touched
by males, posting a schedule to inform clients of when male employees would be on duty,
or letting clients take themselves through the locker room.” Id. at 1297. The court decided
that more factual development was needed. Id. at 1297–98.
48. Wade, 2009 WL 9071049, at *2 (“TSA determined that no less than 33% of
screeners needed to be women to ensure the availability of same gender-searches without
compromising security or significantly increasing wait times at checkpoints.” (emphasis
added) (citation omitted)).
49. For example, in ruling that a restroom attendant BFOQ case should go to trial,
one district court stated that the evidence might demonstrate that it would be infeasible to
schedule shifts whereby male custodians could enter women’s restrooms. See Hernandez
v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214, 217–18 (D. Minn. 1992). The court referred to
affidavits indicating that, “when the male custodians worked in the [women’s] dormitory,
the closing of bathrooms led to inconveniences and embarrassing situations that infringed
on [female students’] privacy,” and implied that such evidence could support the argument
that female sex was a BFOQ for the custodial position, on grounds that there was no other
way to simultaneously accommodate both the physical privacy preference and the
convenience preference. Id.
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Psychological Comfort with the Same Sex

By contrast, in situations where the customer will not be seen
naked—and the preference for same-gender care stems from a
psychological, rather than physical, rationale—courts are much less
deferential. There are indeed a few cases where courts have held that
psychological comfort/affinity with the same sex can give rise to a
BFOQ, hence its inclusion among this Article’s taxonomy of
preferred preferences. But such rulings are rare. One example is
Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hospital,50 in which the defendantemployer was a residential hospital for emotionally disturbed and
sexually abused children and adolescents.51 There, the defendants
argued that the hospital should be able to take sex into account when
making hiring and scheduling decisions in order to ensure that there
were enough male and female employees assigned to all shifts.52 The
Third Circuit agreed that the hospital had established that “the
therapeutic aspects of the child care specialist job require the
consideration of gender,” noting that adolescent patients were more
comfortable discussing their sexuality concerns with staff members of
the same sex and that “subtle interactions such as ‘role modeling’”
were part of the job.53
More commonly, however, courts reject such arguments.54 In
EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp.,55 for example, the district court rejected a
weight loss center’s argument that female sex was a BFOQ for being
50. 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996).
51. Id. at 130, 132.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 133–34; cf. Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2008)
(accepting that the role-modeling/mentoring aspects of the counselor position for a
juvenile detention facility pointed toward “the usefulness of mentors of the same sex” but
rejecting the defendant’s contention that this was necessary even during the night shift
because the juveniles were largely sleeping during that period). While physical privacy
concerns were also in the mix since part of the job involved accompanying young patients
to the bathroom and bathing them, the Healey court nonetheless focused on the
psychological concerns. See Healey, 78 F.3d at 133–34.
54. See Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056, 1063–64, 1068–69 (D.
Ariz. 1999) (rejecting Marriott’s argument that female sex was a BFOQ for massage
therapists and explaining that, notwithstanding Marriott’s evidence that most of its
customers—particularly women who had suffered some form of sexual abuse—preferred
female masseuses, “the legitimate job duties of a massage therapist . . . do not include
viewing or touching female clients’ breasts or either male or female clients’ genitalia”);
Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 701, 704–05 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (rejecting defense by
workshop for mentally ill young adult males that male sex was a BFOQ to replace the
departing male child care worker when the employer argued that “[i]t was necessary to
have a male in the workshop at all times to provide counseling in advance to male patients
on topics of sexuality and sexual development”).
55. 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
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a weight loss counselor.56 The court acknowledged that the customer
base was 95% women and that some women had objected to having
their measurements taken by a man and indicated that they “would
not feel comfortable discussing emotional and physiological issues
associated with weight loss with a man.”57 But the court dismissed this
as a mere preference and fell back on the so-called rule that
“preferences by customers have little, if any, legitimate role in making
determinations of the legitimacy of discrimination.”58
2. The Equal Burdens Opening
The other customer preference opening within the disparate
treatment framework is more subtle. It lies not in any statutory
language, but in courts’ own assessment of what amounts to disparate
treatment in the first place. Specifically, courts have held that sexdifferentiated appearance requirements—which typically align with
customers’ expressed or assumed aesthetic preferences—do not count
as disparate treatment under Title VII unless they are unequally
burdensome on male and female employees.59 In other words, as long
as the differentiated appearance requirements impose “equal
burdens,” they do not constitute disparate treatment at all.60
This equal burdens doctrine creates an opening for customers’
aesthetic preferences in two ways. First, it explicitly permits such
preferences to give rise to sex-differentiated appearance
requirements—notwithstanding Title VII’s prohibition of disparate
terms and conditions of employment based on sex—as long as the
requirements are equally burdensome. Second, and even more
significantly, courts have applied the equal burdens test very loosely,
allowing employers to defer to customer preferences that are in
reality more burdensome on females than males.61

56. Id. at 305.
57. Id. at 302–03.
58. Id. at 305 (citing Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993)).
59. See, e.g., Viscecchia v. Alrose Allegria LLC, 117 F. Supp. 3d 243, 250–52
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (summarizing the case law in this area).
60. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) (“An appearance
standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not
disparate treatment.”).
61. See, e.g., Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1390–92 (W.D. Mo.
1979) (“An employer is simply not required to account for personal preferences with
respect to dress and grooming standards.”). For a wide-ranging analysis of other judicially
created doctrines that favor employers in discrimination lawsuits, see generally SANDRA
F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE
DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017).
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A blatant example of this latter phenomenon is Craft v.
Metromedia, Inc.,62 a case involving a television reporter named
Christine Craft.63 Almost immediately after hiring Craft as a
coanchor, her television station employer became concerned about
her appearance (namely, her clothing and makeup).64 Craft’s
superiors gave her a book on wardrobe and makeup, and even
brought in a wardrobe consultant for advice.65 After several focus
groups indicated that viewer response to Craft’s appearance was
“overwhelmingly negative,” the oversight intensified and Craft was
put on a “clothing calendar.”66 The television station then conducted
a follow-up telephone survey asking people to rank Craft specifically
on her looks and image in comparison with other female coanchors.67
After negative results came in, she was reassigned from coanchor to
reporter.68
Craft sued under Title VII, alleging that the appearance
standards were based on stereotypes and impermissible customer
preferences and that they were applied to female employees “more
constantly and vigorously than they were applied to men.”69 At the
bench trial, the very consultant who had been brought in to dress
Craft explicitly testified that “viewers—particularly other women—
criticize women more severely than men for their appearance on
camera and that women’s dress is more complex and demanding
because ‘society has made it that way.’”70 Even so, Craft lost at the
trial level and the Eighth Circuit affirmed,71 deferring to the district
court’s conclusion that the station was “equally concerned with the
appearance of its male and female on-air personnel”72 and “enforced
its appearance standards equally as to males and females in response
to individual problems.”73

62. 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
63. Id. at 1207.
64. Id. at 1208. Ironically, Craft had specifically told the employer throughout the
interview process that she was not interested in the position if a “‘makeover’ of her
appearance” would be expected. Id.
65. Id. at 1208–09.
66. Id. at 1209 (quoting Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 873 (W.D. Mo.
1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1209–10.
70. Id. at 1214.
71. Id. at 1207–08.
72. Id. at 1217.
73. Id. at 1213.
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Craft dates back to 1985, but its themes resonate in a more recent
case, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,74 decided in 2006. There,
plaintiff Darlene Jespersen, who worked as a bartender, brought a
Title VII claim challenging new sex-based appearance standards that
had been imposed by her employer, Harrah’s.75 Under those rules,
known as the “‘Personal Best’ program,” both male and female
employees were supposed to be “well groomed, appealing to the eye,
[and] firm and body toned.”76 Additionally, men’s hair could not
extend below their shirt collar, while women were required to wear
their hair teased, curled, or styled, and were also required to wear
face powder, blush, mascara, and lip color.77 Jespersen, who was
uncomfortable wearing makeup, quit and then sued.78 The Ninth
Circuit ruled against her, invoking the equal burdens doctrine and
concluding that Jespersen had not done enough to prove that it was
more time consuming and expensive for women to comply with the
daily makeup requirement than for men to comply with keeping their
hair relatively short.79
Thus, in both Craft and Jespersen, customer preferences for
aesthetic appeal—namely, for women to have a certain feminine
look—drove the employer requirements. There was clear evidence of
this: the television station in Craft had relied on viewer focus groups
and surveys,80 and Harrah’s had specifically stated that its “Personal
Best” policy stemmed from customer preferences, explaining when
the policy was implemented that its “customers have said that when
they go to a casino, they’re looking for a night out and they want
people to be well-groomed.”81 Moreover, as Judge Kozinski pointed
out in his dissent, there is no “rational doubt” that requiring women
to apply full facial makeup each day is more burdensome than
requiring men to keep their hair short.82 Yet each court declined to
74. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
75. Id. at 1105.
76. Id. at 1107.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1108.
79. Id. at 1108–11. The majority also disagreed that Harrah’s had engaged in
impermissible sex stereotyping under Title VII, stating that the policy “requires all of the
bartenders to wear exactly the same uniforms” and “is for the most part unisex.” Id. at
1111–12.
80. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 1985).
81. Scott Mayerowitz, Harrah’s Draws Criticism; Employee Appearance Standards Go
“Overboard,” PROVIDENCE J., reprinted in HOTEL ONLINE (July 13, 2004),
https://www.hotel-online.com/News/PR2004_3rd/Jul04_HarrahsPolicies.html [https://perma.cc/
BC46-EGU5].
82. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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grapple fully with these preferences’ greater burdens on women.
Instead, the courts insisted that the burdens seemed equal enough
and ruled for the employer. As further discussed in Part II, because
these customer preferences resonated with the judges’ intuitive sense
of natural, appropriate gender-based appearance conventions, the
courts dismissed the differential burdens that they actually imposed as
de minimis.
Although the equal burdens doctrine is an important customer
preference opening, it is not unlimited. Courts have recognized that
sex-differentiated appearance policies that are facially more
burdensome on women than men amount to disparate treatment. For
example, in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,83 the Ninth Circuit struck
down a policy whereby female employees had to meet the
requirements of a medium body frame standard, while male
employees only had to satisfy a large body frame standard.84
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit recently held that sex-differentiated
appearance codes may be unacceptably burdensome on transgender
employees who are forced to follow the code for their assigned sex
rather than the one for their gender identity.85 This holding tracks
Kimberly Yuracko’s observation that “[t]ranssexuals are beginning to
win because they are able to convince courts that, for them, sex-based
grooming demands are painful. In contrast, non-transsexual gender
benders [like Craft and Jespersen] lose precisely because courts view
the burdensomeness for them of such conformity demands as

83. 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
84. Id. at 855. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit struck down a Continental Airlines policy
that required “an exclusively female category of flight attendants, and no other
employees,” to comply with a weight restriction. Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d
602, 610 (9th Cir. 1982).
85. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 576–77, 580
(6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 20, 2018). However, the court
did not strike down the code itself but just indicated that the transitioning employee
should be able to follow the code that comported with her gender identity. Id. at 573 (“We
are not considering, in this case, whether the Funeral Home violated Title VII by requiring
men to wear pant suits and women to wear skirt suits. Our question instead is whether the
Funeral Home could legally terminate Stephens, notwithstanding that she fully intended
to comply with the company’s sex-specific dress code, simply because she refused to
conform to the Funeral Home’s notion of her sex.”). Thus, the court apparently viewed
the situation less as an unequal burdens case than as one about discrimination based on
transgender/transitioning status and gender stereotypes. Cf. Creed v. Family Express
Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 WL 35237, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (rejecting a
transgender employee’s claim that it was sex discrimination not to allow her to start
following the dress code for female employees on grounds that the employer’s
“requirement that male and female employees adhere to grooming standards matching
their [assigned] gender doesn’t discriminate on the basis of sex”).
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trivial.”86 Indeed, once the burden of a gender-based-appearance
code is less facially apparent and measurable, customers’ stereotypical
preferences about employees’ appearance have the opportunity to
sneak back into the equal burdens opening, without being recognized
as a form of discrimination at all.
B.

The Disparate Impact Opening: The Business Necessity Defense

Like disparate treatment, the second model of discrimination,
disparate impact, is addressed by all three federal antidiscrimination
statutes.87 Unlike disparate treatment liability, disparate impact
liability covers situations where an employer has a facially neutral
practice that nonetheless has a disparate impact as to a statutorily
protected characteristic.88 For example, a requirement that all
employees be at least six feet tall would have a disparate impact as to
sex, even though it would not constitute facially disparate treatment.
Under Title VII, if a plaintiff-employee can identify such a practice
and statistically prove its disparate impact, then the defendantemployer must defend itself by showing that the practice is “job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity” and that an alternative practice would not suffice instead.89
The ADEA also allows disparate impact claims, although the
employer can defend against them simply by showing that the
differentiation is “based on reasonable factors other than age.”90
Finally, the ADA provides its own version of disparate impact
liability, stating that it is impermissible to use
qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with
a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the
standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered
entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question
and is consistent with business necessity.91
Thus, in the disparate impact context, there is one key opening
through which customer preferences can potentially enter: the “job

86. YURACKO, supra note 34, at 98.
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), 12112(b)(6)
(2012).
88. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (1987).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) to (ii), 2(k)(1)(C) (2012).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2012).
91. § 12112(b)(6).
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related . . . and consistent with business necessity” defense92 (or, in the
ADEA, the roughly analogous “reasonable factors other than age”
defense,93 which is even easier to satisfy).
This defense, like the BFOQ defense, is now statutory. But the
defense—along with the very concept of disparate impact liability at
all—originated with the Supreme Court. In 1971, just a few years after
Title VII was enacted, the Supreme Court decided Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.94 Prior to Title VII’s passage, Duke Power had facially
discriminated, only allowing African Americans to work in one of its
five departments.95 Once Title VII was passed, Duke Power adopted a
facially neutral policy whereby only applicants with high school
diplomas and passing scores on two aptitude tests could obtain
positions in the four other, more desirable departments.96
At the time, Title VII only prohibited disparate treatment. But
Duke Power’s policy had a clearly disparate impact as to race, and the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that such practices could also
violate Title VII.97 “The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation,” the Court explained.98 “The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited.”99 The Supreme Court later made this business
necessity defense easier to satisfy, stating in its 1989 Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio100 decision that “the dispositive issue is whether
a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer. . . . [T]here is no requirement that
the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the
employer’s business for it to pass muster . . . .”101 Wards Cove further
stated that, for this defense, the burden of persuasion always
remained with the plaintiff.102

92. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
93. § 623(f)(1).
94. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
95. Id. at 426–27.
96. Id. at 427–28.
97. Id. at 430–31 (“[P]ractices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo
of prior discriminatory employment practices.”).
98. Id. at 431.
99. Id.
100. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
101. Id. at 659 (internal citations omitted).
102. Id.
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Congress, however, rejected Wards Cove’s softening of the
standard. It passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title
VII by, inter alia, codifying the disparate impact form of liability and
a more stringent business necessity defense.103 Accordingly, Title VII
now states that once a disparate impact is shown, the employer bears
the burden of proving that the “challenged practice is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”104
The accompanying legislative history expressly states that Title VII
was amended “to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job
related’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio.”105
Neither Title VII’s text nor the above Supreme Court decisions,
however, clarify whether a strong customer preference is enough to
establish the defense by making a practice “job related . . . and
consistent with business necessity.”106 And as with the BFOQ defense,
courts have allowed certain customer preferences into this opening.
In particular, there are two customer preferences that have been
fairly successful in forming the bases of successful business necessity
defenses: aesthetic appeal and English-speaking environment. The
aesthetic appeal preference is implicated in disparate impact
challenges to appearance policies, while the English-speaking
environment preference is implicated in disparate impact challenges
to English-speaking-only workplace rules.
1. Aesthetic Appeal
The cases involving disparate impact challenges to customer
preference-based appearance policies most often involve policies with
disparate impacts as to race.107 Of course, there are many appearance
policies that implicate other protected characteristics, particularly sex
and religion. But the sex-based appearance policies are usually not
facially neutral—indeed, their whole point is to have different rules
for males and females—so they generally trigger disparate treatment
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) to (ii) (2012).
104. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
105. 137 CONG. REC. 28,622 (1991) (citations omitted).
106. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). For further discussion of the lack of clarity in what an
employer must show to prove business necessity, see, for example, Lanning v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 181 F.3d 478, 485–90 (3d Cir. 1999);
Grover, supra note 7, at 391–93.
107. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993)
(discussing a no-beard policy challenged for its disparate impact on African American
men).
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challenges instead, as seen above in the equal burdens discussion.108
Meanwhile, facially neutral appearance policies that have a disparate
impact on religion, such as prohibitions on beards or head coverings,
are usually challenged under a failure-to-accommodate theory, as
discussed below.109 For a facially neutral appearance policy that
disproportionately affects a particular race, however, the disparate
impact claim is key.
Most commonly, the appearance policy being challenged under a
disparate impact theory involves one very specific aspect of
appearance: hair, either on the face or the head. Citing customer
preference, numerous employers have adopted policies prohibiting
beards or certain types of hairstyles, like braids or dreadlocks.110 The
disparate impact challenges to no-beard policies (brought exclusively
by men) have generally succeeded, but the challenges to hairstyle
policies (usually, though not always, brought by women) have
generally failed.
Employers’ no-beard policies can have a disparate impact on
African American men, a significant portion of whom have a skin
condition called pseudofolliculitis barbae (“PFB”), which results in
irritation—to the point of infection and scarring—from shaving.111 For
many, the only treatment for the condition is to grow a beard.112
Courts have generally accepted the argument that, because African
American men suffer from PFB at a much higher rate, no-beard
policies have a disparate impact as to race.113 Moreover, courts have
held that customer preferences for clean-shaven employees are not
enough to satisfy the business necessity defense to disparate impact
108. See supra Section I.A.2.
109. See infra Section I.C.
110. See, e.g., Bradley, 7 F.3d at 799 (citing a public opinion survey commissioned by
the pizza chain to justify its no-beard policy). Some such policies are implemented for
safety reasons instead of customer preferences, but those are beyond the scope of this
Article. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1114 (11th Cir. 1993)
(addressing a no-beard policy for firefighters based on safety standards for the use of
respirator masks).
111. See, e.g., Roopal V. Kundu & Stavonnie Patterson, Dermatologic Conditions in
Skin of Color: Part II. Disorders Occurring Predominantly in Skin of Color, 87 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 859, 860 (2013); Gary J. Brauner, Pseudofolliculitis Barbae, SKIN OF COLOR
SOC’Y, http://skinofcolorsociety.org/dermatology-education/1408-2/ [https://perma.cc/3YTC48FB].
112. See Kundu & Patterson, supra note 111, at 860.
113. See, e.g., Richardson v. Quik Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1155–56 (S.D. Iowa
1984); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D. Colo. 1981). But see EEOC v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the EEOC failed to
prove that Greyhound’s no-beard policy had a disproportionate impact on African
American employees).
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claims. For example, in Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc.,114
Domino’s Pizza tried to justify its no-beard policy on customer
preference grounds, citing a public opinion survey indicating “that up
to twenty percent of those surveyed would react negatively to a
delivery man wearing a beard.”115 The Eighth Circuit flatly refused to
allow this purported customer preference into the jobrelated/business necessity opening, explaining that “[e]ven if the
survey results indicated a significant customer apprehension
regarding beards, which they do not, the results would not constitute
evidence of a sufficient business justification defense for Domino’s
strict no-beard policy.”116 Notably, the Eighth Circuit drew from two
other customer preference openings to support its proposition that
customer preferences should typically not be taken into account in
discrimination cases.117 Not only did the court cite the BFOQ cases’
language about the usual irrelevance of customer preferences, but it
also borrowed the “reasonable accommodation” terminology to
explain why the PFB-suffering employees needed an exemption.118
African American women, however, have had a much harder
time challenging employer policies—presumably based on aesthetic
appeal preferences—that prohibit dreadlocks, braids, or other
“natural hairstyle[s] . . . that [enable] black women to wear their hair
down and long while retaining the natural structure and texture of
their hair.”119 It seems obvious that such policies have a disparate
impact on African American women, because, as Onwuachi-Willig
explains:
[A] ban on natural hairstyles for black women leaves black
women with far fewer choices in hair grooming than white
women. Essentially, due to the biological nature of black
women’s hair, such policies currently leave black women with
one of two choices if they wish to wear their hair long and
hanging down: either (1) straighten their hair with a chemical
relaxer or hot comb or (2) wear a weave or wig. Both choices
114. 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993).
115. Id. at 799.
116. Id.; see also Richardson, 591 F. Supp. at 1153 (refusing to admit into evidence a
customer satisfaction survey regarding concern with employees’ beards because “the
survey was flawed in both scope and representativeness”).
117. Bradley, 7 F.3d at 799.
118. Id. Indeed, Christine Jolls cited Bradley as an example of the overlapping nature
of disparate impact liability and failure-to-accommodate liability. See Christine Jolls,
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 653–55 (2001).
119. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis
Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1093 (2010).
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require black women to either change the structure and texture
of their natural hair or cover it up. . . . In this sense, many black
women are not allowed to wear their natural hair exactly as it
grows out of their heads as lengthily as white women are
allowed to wear theirs.120
Wendy Greene has also noted the financial, emotional, and physical
burden imposed by such policies.121
Even so, such challenges have generally been unsuccessful.122
Often, the disparate impact argument gets largely overlooked,
sometimes even by plaintiffs.123 In a recent case, EEOC v. Catastrophe
Management Solutions,124 the EEOC brought suit on behalf of an
African American job applicant whose job offer was rescinded by the
employer when she declined to cut off her dreadlocks pursuant to its
“race-neutral grooming policy.”125 While the EEOC’s proposed
amended complaint utilized “loose language” that seemed to support
a disparate impact argument, the EEOC ultimately stated at oral
argument that it was only pursuing a disparate treatment theory of
liability.126 The Eleventh Circuit ruled for the employer, stating that
“Title VII protects persons in covered categories with respect to their
immutable characteristics, but not their cultural practices.”127 Other
courts have similarly ruled that hairstyle policies do not trigger
disparate impact (or treatment) liability.128

120. Id. at 1089–90.
121. D. Wendy Greene, Splitting Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace
Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management
Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987, 1012–14 (2017).
122. See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., Civil Action No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008
WL 1899306, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp.
229, 231–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
123. See generally Pitts, 2008 WL 1899306 (bringing a disparate treatment challenge,
but not a disparate impact challenge, to an employer’s policy of prohibiting dreadlocks,
cornrows, beads, or shells that were not covered by a hat or visor).
124. 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017).
125. Id. at 1020.
126. Id. at 1024. The decision did not explain why the EEOC dropped the disparate
impact theory. See generally id. (noting that “the EEOC at times conflate[d] the two
liability theories”).
127. Id. at 1030 (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.
1975) (en banc); and then citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980)).
128. See, e.g., Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259, 265–67
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ruling against male employee who challenged employer’s requirement
that employees wear a hat over their dreadlocks, or other “‘unbusinesslike’ hairstyles,” on
the grounds that the rule did not indicate racial animus and that the employee had not
presented enough statistical evidence to make out a disparate impact claim).
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The result is that preferences for compliance with “white and
gendered norm[s]” about women’s hair, as Onwuachi-Willig puts it,129
have crept into the openings within employment discrimination law.
As with the preferences for a feminine look in Craft and Jespersen,
courts have a hard time recognizing that these preferences are
discriminatory at all.
2. English-Only Environment
The second big customer preference that has repeatedly entered
the business necessity opening is the preference for an English-only
speaking environment. In numerous cases citing customer
preferences, employers have required employees to speak English
whenever they are near customers, not just when they are actually
talking to the customer.130 In EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC,131 for
example, the policy of Sephora cosmetic stores was that sales floor
staff had to speak English—even to each other—whenever they were
on the sales floor while clients were present.132 Similarly, in Pacheco v.
New York Presbyterian Hospital,133 the hospital’s unofficial policy was
that employees could speak only English when they were in the
vicinity of patients.134 In both cases, the employers justified their
English-only policies by stating that when their employees conversed
in Spanish, their customers/patients felt uncomfortable because they
felt that they could not approach the employees135 or that the
employees might be mocking them.136
Employers in these sorts of cases have generally prevailed. In
both Sephora and Pacheco, the courts assumed that these policies had
disparate impacts as to national origin. But they still ultimately ruled
that these purported customer preferences created a valid jobrelated/business necessity defense.137 “[I]f a customer preference is
sufficiently related to job performance then it qualifies as a ‘business
necessity,’” the Pacheco court explained, ruling that patients’
discomfort with overhearing Spanish conversations that they thought

129. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 119, at 1083.
130. Note, however, that such rules do not go as far as requiring employees to speak
English in the workplace at all times. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
131. 419 F. Supp. 2d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
132. Id. at 410–11.
133. 593 F. Supp. 2d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
134. See id. at 606–07.
135. Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 416–17.
136. Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 614, 621–22.
137. Id. at 622–23; Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 414, 418.
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might be about them was enough to qualify.138 “[P]romoting
politeness to customers is a valid business necessity for requiring sales
employees to speak English in their presence,” the Sephora court
similarly stated.139 Both courts agreed that the employers did not even
need to demonstrate that a particular percentage of customers felt
this way.140
The same sort of language in the physical privacy BFOQ cases—
that employers are not responding to a mere preference but
something more legitimate and weighty—often appears in these
English-language business necessity cases. As the Sephora court
stated in describing why salespeople could not speak in Spanish even
to each other while customers were present, “[w]hen salespeople
speak in a language customers do not understand, the effects on
helpfulness, politeness and approachability are real and are not a
matter of abstract preference.”141 As discussed further in Parts II and
III, this often-facile distinction between mere preferences and
something more is one of the keys to unlocking which preferences
receive the most deference.
C.

The Reasonable Accommodation Opening: The Undue Hardship
Defense

The last model of discrimination—the failure to provide
reasonable accommodation—only appears in the context of religion
and disability. For religion, this obligation appears in Title VII, which
prohibits discrimination based on religion,142 and defines religion as
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate [the] religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”143 For disability,
this accommodation appears in the ADA, which similarly defines
discrimination to include “not making reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”144
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (quoting Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 416).
Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 621–22; Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
Id. § 2000e(j).
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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In both statutes, the key opening through which customer
preferences can enter is the undue hardship defense, which is closely
related to the question of whether an accommodation is reasonable in
the first place. This opening, however, is much wider in the religion
context than the disability context because of the varying meaning of
“undue hardship.” While Title VII provides no definition of “undue
hardship,”145 the Supreme Court interpreted it in 1977 to mean
anything “more than a de minimis cost.”146 By contrast, the ADA
defines “undue hardship” as “an action requiring significant difficulty
or expense.”147
Title VII’s low threshold for what counts as an undue hardship—
i.e., anything imposing more than a de minimis cost—has created a
big opening through which customer preferences can enter. Indeed, in
the religion context, three main customer preferences can provide the
basis for successful employer defenses: aesthetic appeal, the desire to
avoid an employee’s proselytization or judgment, and convenience.
1. Aesthetic Appeal
Typically, the aesthetic appeal preference comes up in the
religious accommodation context when there is a conflict between an
employer’s general appearance policy (most often relating to head
coverings, clean-shavenness, or body piercings) and a particular
employee’s religious practice. The EEOC’s guidance states that, “[i]n
most instances, employers are required by federal law to make
exceptions to their usual rules or preferences to permit applicants and
employees to observe religious dress and grooming practices.”148
Indeed, there are numerous EEOC consent decrees and judicial
decisions along those lines.149
145. See id. § 2000e (mentioning “undue hardship” under “religion” but providing no
explanation of the term’s meaning).
146. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2012).
148. Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_
religious_garb_grooming.cfm [https://perma.cc/N4TC-UAWF] (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., Muhammad v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 52 F. Supp. 3d 468, 474, 484
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that an employee could go to trial on her claim that the New
York City Transit Authority, in transferring her from a customer-contact position after
she refused to remove or cover her khimar, failed to accommodate her practice of Islam);
Dodd v. SEPTA, Civil Action No. 06-4213, 2008 WL 2902618, at *7–10 (E.D. Pa. July 24,
2008) (holding that an employee could go to trial on his claim that his employer, in
requiring him to cut his hair, failed to reasonably accommodate his Rastafarian beliefs);
EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., No. C04-1291JLR, 2005 WL 2090677, at *1,
*5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005) (holding that an employee could go to trial on his claim
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But most does not mean all. In several cases, parting with the
EEOC’s interpretation, courts have ruled that employers could make
out the undue hardship defense to religious accommodation claims by
relying on appearance policies stemming from expressed or assumed
customer preferences.
A good example here is Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,150 a
First Circuit case involving the “no facial jewelry,” other than
earrings, provision of Costco’s dress code.151 Costco’s employee
handbook justified its dress code as follows: “Appearance and
perception play a key role in member service. . . . All Costco
employees must practice good grooming and personal hygiene to
convey a neat, clean and professional image.”152 Pursuant to this
policy, Costco asked a cashier with an eyebrow piercing to remove it,
replace it with a clear retainer, or cover it.153 She refused, stating that
she was a member of the Church of Body Modification (which had
about 1000 members) and felt compelled to display her piercings at all
times.154 Costco terminated her and she sued.155 Although the EEOC
concluded that she had a valid religious discrimination claim and that
the employer could not satisfy the undue hardship defense, the
district court granted summary judgment to Costco and the First
Circuit affirmed.156 The First Circuit stated that employees who
regularly interact with customers “reflect on their employers,” that
Costco had determined that facial piercings “detract from the ‘neat,
clean and professional image’ that it aims to cultivate,” and that this
was a business decision within Costco’s discretion.157
Interestingly, the Cloutier court fully acknowledged that this was
just a question of customer preference, rather than elevating it to
something weightier (as the courts in the physical privacy BFOQ and
English-language business necessity cases tend to do). “[I]t is not the
law that customer preference is an insufficient justification as a matter

that his employer, in refusing to allow him to show his religious tattoos, failed to
reasonably accommodate his practice of Kemetecism); Consent Decree at 1, EEOC v.
Family Foods, Inc., No. 5:11-cv-00394-FL (E.D.N.C. Apr. 30, 2012) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (settling case alleging failure to accommodate long hair worn
pursuant to employee’s Nazirite religious beliefs).
150. 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004).
151. Id. at 128–29.
152. Id. at 135.
153. Id. at 128.
154. Id. at 129.
155. Id. at 130.
156. Id. at 128, 130.
157. Id. at 135–36.
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of law,” the court observed.158 Shortly thereafter, a district court
within the First Circuit followed Cloutier to rule against a Rastafarian
employee’s challenge to a clean-shavenness policy imposed by Jiffy
Lube,159 while warning that “[i]f Cloutier’s language approving
employer prerogatives regarding ‘public image’ is read broadly, the
implications for persons asserting claims for religious discrimination
in the workplace may be grave.”160
That warning was prescient. Recently, in Camara v. Epps Air
Service, Inc.,161 a magistrate judge rejected the discrimination claim of
a Muslim employee who was told that she could not work as a
customer service representative at an airport terminal while wearing a
hijab162 because “[t]he perception that customers have of a business is
critical to its success,”163 and some “[c]ustomers might have a
problem” seeing an employee wearing a hijab in addition to her
uniform.164 The Camara court went on to suggest that the employee
should just accept a transfer to a non-customer-facing position165—a
view that conflicts with the EEOC’s guidance on the topic.166
2. Avoidance of Proselytization or Judgment
Unlike aesthetic appeal, the second big customer preference here
is specific only to religion cases: the preference not to feel
proselytized to or judged. This preference comes up when religious
employees request an accommodation that allows them to (a) convey
a religious message or (b) overtly decline to perform certain aspects
158. Id. at 136 (quoting EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (N.D. Ga.
1981)).
159. Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9, 11–12 (D. Mass. 2006).
160. Id. at 17.
161. 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
162. Id. at 1319.
163. Id. at 1318.
164. Id. at 1322.
165. Id. at 1330 (stating that the employee’s refusal to accept the transfer was
unreasonable and that she left the employer “no choice but to terminate her
employment”).
166. See Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities,
supra note 148 (“May an employer assign an employee to a non-customer contact position
because of customer preference? No. Assigning applicants or employees to a noncustomer contact position because of actual or feared customer preference violates Title
VII’s prohibition on limiting, segregating, or classifying employees based on religion. Even
if the employer is following its uniformly applied employee policy or practice, it is not
permitted to segregate an employee due to fear that customers will have a biased response
to religious garb or grooming. . . . [C]ustomer preference is not undue hardship.”). Federal
courts, however, are not bound by EEOC guidance; rather, it is only binding to the extent
that the courts find it persuasive. See, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 679 F.3d 41, 53
(2d Cir. 2012).
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of the job, and the employer refuses on grounds that this
accommodation will offend customers, rendering it unreasonable
and/or an undue hardship. Courts have been quite receptive to these
arguments. Indeed, as discussed in Part II, this is one of the most
preferred preferences.
In cases involving employees’ challenges to their employers’
refusal to let them convey religious messages to customers, employers
generally win. In Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc.,167 for
instance, an employer told an employee that she had to stop saying
“Have a Blessed Day” when speaking or writing to customers, though
they let her keep using the phrase with co-workers.168 The Seventh
Circuit rejected her religious discrimination claim, holding that the
employer had done enough to accommodate her.169 The religious
speech was more extreme in Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,170
where an employee sought to post in his cubicle anti-gay Biblical
quotes that would be visible to both colleagues and customers,171 and
in Knight v. Connecticut Department of Public Health,172 where a
nurse consultant and sign language interpreter argued that they had a
Title VII right to proselytize to clients about topics including
homosexuality and church attendance.173 Both the Ninth Circuit and
Second Circuit, respectively, held that Title VII’s religious
accommodation requirements did not require their employers to
allow this speech, apparently because the speech was so likely to
offend others.174
Not only are courts sympathetic to employers’ desire not to
offend customers, but they also often note that allowing such speech
could expose the employer to liability. For example, the Peterson
court, noting that the employee’s anti-gay speech might make his
colleagues feel harassed, stated that “an employer need not
accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if doing so would result
in discrimination against his co-workers or deprive them of

167. 274 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001).
168. Id. at 473–74.
169. Id. at 476–77.
170. 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
171. Id. at 601.
172. 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001).
173. Id. at 160–62.
174. Peterson, 358 F.3d at 607–08 (noting the effect on colleagues); Knight, 275 F.3d at
168 (focusing on the effect on clients).
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contractual or other statutory rights.”175 Similarly, the Knight court
pointed out that the Connecticut Department of Health was a
government entity and that “[p]ermitting appellants to evangelize
while providing services to clients would jeopardize the state’s ability
to provide services in a religion-neutral matter.”176
The case law is slightly more mixed about the role of customer
preferences when a religious employee’s requested accommodation
involves being excused from certain aspects of the job. Often, courts
do not even delve into the likely customer response, because they rule
for the employer on grounds that the particular accommodation
would impose an undue hardship by requiring the employer to
disproportionately burden current employees or hire a new employee,
thereby imposing more than de minimis costs.177
To the extent that the analysis does take potential customer
response into account, the issue seems to be whether the employee’s
opt-out would be actually visible to customers and upset them. In
Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Services, Inc.,178 for example, a
religious employee stated that she was willing to counsel gay clients,
but was not willing to counsel them about their romantic/sexual
relationships. She therefore sought to be allowed to refer them to
other counselors when those matters came up.179 The Fifth Circuit
held that this requested accommodation would indeed impose an
175. Peterson, 358 F.3d at 607 (citing Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 432 U.S.
63, 81 (1977); and then citing Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir.
1996)).
176. Knight, 275 F.3d at 168 (citing Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012,
1020 (4th Cir. 1996); and then citing Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341–42
(8th Cir. 1995)).
177. See, e.g., Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x 581, 584–85 (7th
Cir. 2007) (finding that a pharmacist’s request to be relieved of all counter and telephone
duties to avoid participating in the distribution of birth control would “require[] other
employees to assume a disproportionate workload” (citing Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs.,
Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001)); Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 923, 925–
26 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that Title VII does not require police department to
accommodate officer who refused to work at a casino for religious reasons in part because
“[e]xcusing officers from the risk of unpopular assignments would create substantial costs
for fellow officers who must step in, as well as the police force as an entity”); cf. Hellinger
v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364–66 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (stating that “[c]ase law
supports the Defendant’s argument that having to hire an additional employee in the
pharmacy department to work alongside the Plaintiff to ensure that the Plaintiff would
never have to sell condoms is more than a de minimis cost,” but noting that there might be
other reasonable accommodations that would not impose an undue hardship (citing
Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982); and then citing Lee v.
ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1994)).
178. 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001).
179. Id. at 497.
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undue hardship on the employer.180 Although the court primarily
focused on the burden that this would impose on her fellow
counselors, the court also mentioned the discomfort that an abrupt
referral would cause her clients, noting that psychological counseling
involves “trust relationships developed over time.”181 The court
further stated that, while the “logistical and economic impact” on the
employer and other employees alone was enough to constitute an
undue hardship, the “potential negative impact” on customers added
weight to its decision.182
By contrast, in Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp.,183 a federal district
court allowed to proceed the religious discrimination claim of an
Orthodox Jewish job applicant who was not hired by Eckerd for a
pharmacist position because of his refusal to sell condoms.184 Eckerd
had a policy of letting customers purchase over-the-counter items at
the pharmacy counter, and there were times when the pharmacist
might be the only employee at the counter.185 Eckerd argued that the
only options for accommodating the plaintiff’s religious practice
would be to hire an additional pharmacist to work side-by-side with
the plaintiff, allow the plaintiff to refuse to sell condoms to customers,
or request that the customers take condom purchases to another
register.186 It further argued that all three options would impose
undue hardships by cutting into profits and/or violating Eckerd’s
customer service policy.187 The plaintiff responded by suggesting other
accommodations, such as being scheduled to work during hours in
which a clerk or pharmacy technician was also on duty at the
180. Id. at 503.
181. Id. at 501.
182. Id. at 501 n.15.
183. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
184. Id. at 1360–61. Note that numerous states have “conscience clauses” or “refusal
laws” that give certain employees, particularly those providing healthcare services, the
right to refuse to perform services relating to abortion or contraception. For a detailed
chart of such laws, see Conscience and Refusal Clauses, REWIRE.NEWS (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/conscience-and-refusal-clauses/ [https://perma.
cc/469X-CHGH]. While these laws provide employees with certain state law protections or
rights, they do not bear on whether such an employee can win a federal religious
discrimination lawsuit under Title VII against an employer who declines to accommodate
such practices. For a discussion of conscience clauses in the context of a pharmacist’s right
to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions, see generally Karissa Eide, Comment, Can a
Pharmacist Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescriptions on Moral or Religious Grounds?, 42
CAL. W. L. REV. 121 (2005).
185. Hellinger, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 (“Even in some stores that employ drug clerks
and pharmacy technicians, there are times when the pharmacist may work alone.”).
186. Id. at 1364.
187. Id.
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pharmacy counter to ring up sales.188 The court ruled that because
there were still genuine disputes of material fact, summary judgment
should be denied.189 Thus, the Hellinger court left open precisely what
role potential customer offense should play in the analysis. It did
somewhat minimize the concerns about customer offense by
describing them as speculative, but it also emphasized the plaintiff’s
evidence that there were ways to accommodate him that might be
altogether invisible to the customer.190
3. Convenience
The last preference that appears in the reasonable
accommodation/undue hardship opening, albeit rarely, is the
convenience preference. As with the BFOQ opening, convenience
tends to be a supporting, rather than primary, preference. Recall that
in the BFOQ context, courts have been receptive to the idea that
same-sex service can become a BFOQ when the alternatives—such as
having all females leave the restroom when a male custodian comes
in, or having very long airport security screening lines to ensure that
all pat-downs are performed by an employee of the same sex—will
unacceptably inconvenience customers.191
Similarly, employees’ refusal to perform certain aspects of a job
for religious reasons may not only offend customers but also
inconvenience them by forcing them to wait for or find another
employee who can complete the task.192 Thus, just as the convenience
preference can help create a BFOQ, so too can the convenience
preference support the nonproselytization/judgment preference. In
the latter context, the two preferences work together to yield the

188. Id. at 1366.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See supra Section I.A.1.
192. One recent news story documented the ordeal of a woman who, after being
diagnosed with an unviable pregnancy, faced a Walgreens pharmacist who refused to fill
her prescription for medication that would induce a miscarriage. See Louis Lucero II,
Walgreens Pharmacist Denies Woman with Unviable Pregnancy the Medication Needed to
End It, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/walgreenspharmacist-pregnancy-miscarriage.html [https://perma.cc/9G58-XN4L (dark archive)].
Her Facebook post, which went viral, described not only the logistics of having to go to
another Walgreens the next morning for the prescription but also the sadness and offense
she felt: “I left Walgreens in tears, ashamed and feeling humiliated by a man who knows
nothing of my struggles but feels it is his right to deny medication prescribed to me by my
doctor.” Nicole Mone, FACEBOOK (June 22, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/nicole.
arteaga1?lst=1188816819%3A1599340517%3A1529802886 [https://perma.cc/Q8J4-QT5R
(staff-uploaded archive)].
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conclusion that a requested accommodation is unreasonable and/or
will impose an undue hardship.193
The reasonable accommodation/undue hardship defense also
appears in the ADA.194 Unlike religious discrimination cases,
however, customer preferences are generally absent from employer
defenses to claims of disability discrimination. This absence stems
from the ADA’s stringent definition of undue hardship to mean
“action requiring significant difficulty or expense,”195 as well as its
parallel provision that reasonable accommodations can indeed
include numerous forms of job modifications.196 Of course, there is
still the potential for customer preferences to provide the basis of a
successful employer defense here. For example, a disabled
employee’s requested accommodation could theoretically be so
upsetting to customers that it would impose significant difficulty on
an employer, thus removing the obligation to provide it. But it is
difficult to imagine such a situation. After all, accommodations for
disabled employees are unlikely to offend customers in the way that
certain religious accommodations, such as allowing proselytization,
might. Furthermore, the customer inconveniences that might result
from accommodations for disabled employees, while perhaps
imposing more than a de minimis cost, are unlikely to reach the level
of imposing a significant expense. Thus, it is unsurprising that so far
there have been no cases along these lines.
II. A TAXONOMY OF THE PREFERRED PREFERENCES
In the above discussion, six preferred preferences came to the
fore: aesthetic appeal (in various forms), physical privacy from the
opposite sex, psychological comfort with the same sex, an Englishspeaking environment, avoidance of proselytization or judgment, and
convenience. Each of these preferences has, at least occasionally,

193. For example, in Noesen v. Medical Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x 581 (7th
Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit ruled against a pharmacist, who was terminated after he
placed customers on indefinite holds when they sought to fill birth control prescriptions,
because the accommodation he requested (refusing to interact in any way with customers
seeking birth control) imposed an undue hardship since the only alternatives were keeping
customers waiting or forcing other employees to assume a disproportionate workload. Id.
at 583–85. Thus, the convenience preference—both for customers and for colleagues—was
likely relevant in the analysis.
194. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12113(a) (2012).
195. Id. § 12111(10)(A).
196. Id. § 12111(9) (including, as examples of reasonable accommodations, “job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position . . .
and other similar accommodations”).
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formed the basis of a successful employer defense to what would
otherwise seem like actionable discrimination.
This Part hones in on each preference, looking across the
different statutes and models of discrimination to evaluate the
preference’s overall status as either strongly, moderately, or weakly
preferred. The strongly preferred preferences are those to which
courts frequently defer; the moderately preferred preferences are
those to which courts sometimes defer; and the weakly preferred
preferences are those to which courts occasionally defer. This
Article’s examination of the case law indicates the strongly preferred
preferences are physical privacy from the opposite sex, an Englishspeaking environment, and avoidance of proselytization/judgment;
the moderately preferred preferences are aesthetic appeal and
convenience; and the weakly preferred preference is psychological
comfort with the same sex.
But why does the hierarchy shake out this way? This Article’s
collective look at the preferred preferences illuminates a larger
theme. Although courts do not explicitly say this, there are several
interconnected reasons why these preferences are preferred, perhaps
unconsciously so. As a threshold matter, the preferences intuitively
strike courts as reasonable and natural, both because they do not
seem invidiously discriminatory and because they align with ingrained
social conventions and norms. Once that threshold is met, courts then
(1) consider the preference much weightier than a mere preference
and/or (2) view compliance with the preference as imposing only a
minor burden on employees. Judicial deference to the preference, as
this Article will show, varies according to the extent to which they
find the above factors satisfied.
This Part also considers a seventh possible preferred preference
that is likely to come before courts soon: the customer preference for
diversity, which large corporations are increasingly expressing in
terms of, for instance, law firms’ staffing of their matters.197 Under the
current approach, this is likely to become at most a weakly preferred
preference, meaning that it will only rarely provide the basis for a
successful employer defense.
A. Aesthetic Appeal
The aesthetic appeal preference appears frequently. It enters
through three different customer preference openings: (1) the equal
burdens doctrine for measuring whether disparate treatment has
197. See infra Section II.G.
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occurred; (2) the job-related and consistent with business necessity
defense to disparate impact claims; and (3) the reasonable
accommodation/undue hardship limitation on employers’ obligation
to accommodate their employees’ religious practices.
Differential treatment based on appearance is a widely examined
phenomenon in both law and social science. Indeed, a related debate
in employment law is whether antidiscrimination laws should
explicitly add appearance itself—whether limited to immutable
physical attributes or also including choices like hairstyle, dress, body
piercings, and makeup—as a protected characteristic.198 Some, though
not many, state and local jurisdictions have adopted laws prohibiting
some forms of appearance discrimination.199 For this Article’s
purposes, however, the issue is narrower: whether customers’
expressed or assumed preferences relating to employee appearance
can justify policies that adversely affect employees on the basis of
already-protected characteristics under federal law like sex, race, and
religion. Here, the challenged policies typically involve mutable
aspects of appearance.
For all three of the customer preference openings, we have seen
that the aesthetic appeal preference can justify such policies—up to a
point. Indeed, the status of the aesthetic appeal preference is quite
consistent across the three different openings. Regardless of the
domain, courts generally recognize that aesthetic appeal
preferences—for things like fully made-up faces, clean-shavenness, no
dreadlocks, no body piercings, and/or adherence to other appearance
198. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF
APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 142–43, 154–55 (2010); Robert Post, Prejudicial
Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7–8,
30–31 (2000); Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability? Evaluating the Legal
Framework for Protecting Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 101, 121–22,
135–37 (2016); Enbar Toledano, The Looking-Glass Ceiling: Appearance-Based
Discrimination in the Workplace, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 683, 685–86, 704–14
(2013).
199. D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination based on physical
appearance); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2102(1) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination based on
height and weight); S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33, § 3301 (2018) (prohibiting
discrimination based on height or weight); SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE
§ 9.83.010 (2017) (prohibiting discrimination based on “physical characteristics”);
URBANA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. III, div. 1, § 12-39 (1975) (prohibiting
discrimination based on personal appearance, defined as “weight, height, facial features,
or other aspects of appearance”); HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 12.200(II),
12.201(XV) (2008) (prohibiting discrimination based on personal appearance);
BINGHAMTON, N.Y., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 45-2 (2008) (prohibiting discrimination
based on height or weight); MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 39.03(1) (2018)
(prohibiting discrimination based on physical appearance).
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conventions—are indeed preferences, not necessities. But courts are
still fairly deferential to many iterations of the aesthetic appeal
preference, because they view the preferences as natural and
reasonable, and do not consider it particularly burdensome for
employees to comply. The limit only comes when an aesthetic appeal
preference imposes such an obvious, differential burden in connection
with a protected characteristic that courts cannot ignore it.
The view of conventional aesthetic appeal preferences as natural
and reasonable permeates the case law. In Craft, for instance, the
Eighth Circuit deferred to the district court’s conclusion that “any
extra attention to Craft was the gradual result of her indifference to
the station’s legitimate need that she maintain a professional
businesslike image appropriate to Kansas City.”200 Similarly, in
Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit explicitly justified its ruling in favor of the
employer by stating that for “grooming standards, the touch-stone is
reasonableness.”201 As Robert Post has observed, courts seem to
follow “the conviction that employers reasonably may impose sexbased stereotypes in matters of grooming, so long as these stereotypes
conform to traditional gender conventions.”202
This attitude toward aesthetic appeal preferences is not limited
to gender conventions. As discussed above, in Cloutier, the First
Circuit viewed as reasonable Costco’s concern that a cashier with an
eyebrow piercing would bother customers, explaining that it was
within Costco’s discretion to promote a “neat, clean and professional
image.”203 Similarly, in Camara, a magistrate judge ruled against a
Muslim employee who sought to wear a hijab with her uniform,204
noting that the employer’s denial of her request stemmed from its
“policy requiring its employees to present a neat, professional
appearance.”205
Because these preferences align with courts’ views about what it
means to be “professional,” they sometimes fail to recognize or
acknowledge that the preferences can be burdensome on some
employees in ways that directly implicate their sex, race, or religion.
Both the Craft and Jespersen courts explicitly minimized the
differential burdens that the hair and makeup expectations had on
200. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
201. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(emphasis added).
202. Post, supra note 198, at 34.
203. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004).
204. Camara v. Epps Air Serv., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
205. Id. at 1318.
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female employees, insisting that they were roughly equal to those
imposed on male employees, despite significant evidence to the
contrary. Similarly, in Catastrophe Management Solutions, the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that “dreadlocks are a ‘natural
outgrowth’ of the texture of black hair” but then immediately added
that they were still “not . . . an immutable characteristic of race.”206
The court later described the plaintiff’s refusal to cut her dreadlocks
as a “personal decision.”207 The court thus implied that because
dreadlocks were not literally immutable, it would not significantly
burden African American female employees to comply with a nodreadlocks rule.208
A variant of this nonburdensome rationale also appeared in
Camara, where the court suggested that the Muslim employee’s need
to wear a hijab had been reasonably accommodated by offering to
transfer her to a position where customers could not see her.209 “If she
wanted to wear a hijab at work, plaintiff had a duty to accept the
transfer offer, but she did not,” the court reasoned.210 This is
analogous to other courts’ apparent view that the plaintiff-employees
could have simply worn more makeup or taken out their dreadlocks;
if they chose not to do so, they had to live with the result.
An interesting thought experiment is whether courts would be so
deferential to an aesthetic requirement that deviated from convention.
Angela Onwuachi-Willig has sketched out such a scenario, asking
readers to consider what would happen if an employer required a
white woman to wear her hair in cornrows, dreadlocks, or twists.211
She predicts that “[m]any courts (and many people) in our society
would find the notion of forcing white women to abide by a grooming
policy that does not acknowledge or recognize the structure and

206. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g
denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017).
207. Id. at 1035.
208. See id. at 1030 (differentiating “discrimination on the basis of black hair texture
(an immutable characteristic)” with discrimination “on the basis of black hairstyle (a
mutable choice)”). Significantly, the court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the
EEOC’s and scholar’s briefing about the financial, psychological, and physical burdens
imposed by the rule. See Greene, supra note 121, at 1011–14.
209. Camara, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 1327−28.
210. Id. at 1330. Not all courts have followed this approach. See, e.g., Muhammad v.
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 52 F. Supp. 3d 468, 473, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that an
employee could go to trial on her claim that the New York City Transit Authority, in
transferring her from a customer-contact position after she refused to remove or cover her
khimar, failed to accommodate her practice of Islam).
211. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 119, at 1080−82.
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texture of their hair ludicrous.”212 Similarly, Robert Post writes that it
is only those employers whose requirements track gender-appearance
conventions who tend to be “regarded as enforcing a ‘neutral’
baseline.”213
As noted above, deference to the aesthetic appeal preference is
not unlimited. When an employee can prove that such a preference
imposes a significant, objectively measurable burden in connection
with a protected characteristic, courts close the door to the relevant
doctrinal opening through which the preference can enter. The cases
rejecting nonanalogous body mass limits for male and female
employees (e.g., large frame for men; medium frame for women)
exemplify this limit, as does the developing solicitude for the burden
placed on transgender employees forced to comply with requirements
at odds with their gender identity. So does courts’ differential
treatment of no-beard policies stemming from assumed customer
preferences for clean-shavenness. Men have been successful in
obtaining outright exemptions when they cannot shave because of an
objective medical condition,214 but fare less well in court when they
wear beards for religious reasons.215 In the latter context, the
possibility of an outright exemption is not discussed; instead, the only
judicial analysis is of whether the religious plaintiffs were entitled to
be transferred to a non-customer-contact position.216
One possible explanation for the differential treatment is that the
two no-beard situations implicate two different customer preference
openings: respectively, the business necessity opening within
disparate
impact
liability
versus
the
reasonable
accommodation/undue
hardship
opening
within
religious
212. Id. at 1082.
213. Post, supra note 198, at 29.
214. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993); Johnson
v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 713 F. Supp. 244, 247–48 (W.D. Tenn. 1989); Richardson v. Quik
Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1156 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
215. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., 94 F.3d 314, 315 & n.1, 320–21 (7th Cir.
1996) (remanding case for trial on the question of whether UPS had, in fact, offered to a
religious, beard-wearing employee the reasonable accommodation of a comparable nonpublic-contact position); Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 14−15, 17 (D.
Mass. 2006) (suggesting that if the employer offered a bearded employee a transfer to a
comparable position, that would have been a reasonable accommodation, and ultimately
concluding that the employer made out its undue hardship defense anyway); EEOC v.
Sambo’s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 89–92 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (rejecting claim of Sikh
restaurant employee who wore a beard for religious reasons on the grounds that
customers viewed beards as unsanitary and “that no reasonable accommodation can be
made without undue hardship”). As noted above, this is an area where the courts and the
EEOC sometimes part company.
216. United Parcel Serv., 94 F.3d at 319–20.
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discrimination liability. It is notable, however, that the identical
language about the need for reasonable accommodations for bearded
men has been used by courts in both contexts. Indeed, the Eighth
Circuit specifically borrowed the reasonable accommodation standard
to explain in Bradley why Domino’s deliverymen suffering from PFB
deserved outright exemptions from the beard ban.217
Thus, the key factor for whether courts defer to an aesthetic
preference seems not to be the doctrinal opening in which it appears:
equal
burdens;
business
necessity;
or
reasonable
accommodation/undue hardship. Rather, the outcome-determinative
question is how compelling the court finds the burden imposed on the
employee. Courts tend to be more moved by the plight of men who
cannot shave for medical reasons than of those who wear beards for
religious reasons, just as they are more moved by the burden that sexbased appearance codes place on transgender employees than on
cisgender employees.218
Because courts defer to the aesthetic appeal preference
somewhat frequently—at least absent relatively extreme
circumstances—this Article classifies it as moderately preferred.
B.

Physical Privacy from the Opposite Sex

The physical privacy preference is, in some ways, related to the
aesthetic appeal preference. Both preferences involve bodies: the
aesthetic appeal preference involves the employee’s body, while the
physical privacy preference involves the customer’s nude body (and
sometimes its tactile interaction with the employee’s body).
Moreover, both preferences often implicate aspects of body
stereotyping—what Noa Ben-Asher describes as “stereotyping along
the male/female binary for a range of regulatory purposes.”219 As
Ben-Asher explains, although sex discrimination based on division-oflabor stereotyping is typically unlawful, sex discrimination based on
body stereotyping is often permissible.220 Both the aesthetic appeal
217. Bradley, 7 F.3d at 799 (importing the “reasonable accommodation” language from
the context of religious accommodation into the context of disparate impact by stating “we
hold only that reasonable accommodation must be made for members of the protected
class who suffer from PFB” (emphasis added)).
218. See YURACKO, supra note 34, at 98.
219. Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1191
(2016).
220. Id. at 1192 (“[T]hree types of reasoning have supported the permissible branch of
sex-stereotyping law. The first type is reasoning from cultural or community norms. A
prominent contemporary example of this is the validation of sex-based appearance codes
. . . . The second type of reasoning when validating body stereotyping is from ‘real’
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preference and the physical privacy preference fall into the bodystereotyping category, connecting up with traditional gender-based
conventions about appearance, modesty, and heterosexual desire.
The physical privacy preference, however, has a narrower and
deeper bite than the aesthetic appeal preference. It shows up in only
one opening—the BFOQ defense to intentional sex discrimination—
and receives great deference there. And, of course, this is true even
though the preference implicates a protected characteristic right on its
face. Why does this preference carry so much weight? I suggest that it
is because it scores very highly on the considerations listed above:
privacy for one’s nude body from the opposite sex is very ingrained in
our society, so much so that courts view it more as a need than a
preference. Additionally, while the burden factor might seem to cut
the other way—a real burden is certainly imposed on a job applicant
who is not hired because of his or her sex—the preference does not
necessarily favor either sex in the aggregate.
Yuracko has insightfully dissected why the physical privacy
preference is so strongly preferred.221 “The idea that individuals’
associational preferences have different degrees of legitimacy and
should be given different degrees of social respect is not new,” she
argues.222 Physical privacy preferences sit at the top of the hierarchy
because they are so closely tied to one’s “sense of self.”223 Courts are
quite explicit about this view: in one of the early BFOQ labor nurse
cases, for example, the court wrote that “the body involves the most
sacred and meaningful of all privacy rights,”224 adding that the desire
for physical modesty “is impelled by elementary self-respect and
personal dignity.”225 Indeed, courts often assert that these desires are
more than preferences. As one district court explained in a restroom
case, “[m]ore is involved . . . than a mere preference by customers for
one method of operation over another. The policy at issue in the
instant case involves a recognition of a fundamental concern over the

biological differences. An example of this is a line of cases that affirm the inferior status of
unwed fathers . . . . The third type of reasoning in support of body stereotyping is from
heterosexual risk and privacy. An example of this is the validation of sex-segregated
spaces . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
221. See generally Yuracko, supra note 7 (analyzing courts’ rhetoric in explaining and
defending the difference between permissible and impermissible sex discrimination in
employment).
222. Id. at 191.
223. Id.
224. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as
moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
225. Id. (quoting York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963)).
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exposure of one’s body in the presence of a member of the opposite
sex.”226
Particularly interesting is that courts began holding female sex to
be a BFOQ for labor nurse positions even at a time (the late 1970s)
when most OB-GYNs were still male.227 Yuracko hypothesizes that
“[c]ourts tolerate[d] this seeming illogic because what is important is
not protecting privacy per se, but protecting privacy preferences,
which courts deem to be deeply intertwined with individuals’ sense of
self.”228 Indeed, courts often reach these sorts of conclusions on
summary judgment motions, holding that a trial is unnecessary.
Numerous scholars, including Noa Ben-Asher, Amy Kapczynski,
and Naomi Schoenbaum, have also argued that heteronormative
assumptions are at the core of the physical privacy BFOQ. They
assert that courts defer to this preference (and/or that customers
express it in the first place) out of the misplaced view that sexual
desire can only exist between an employee and customer of the
opposite sex.229 “The same-sex BFOQ responds to this presumed
heterosexual desire by denying opposite sex contact,” Ben-Asher
writes.230 In other words, these scholars accuse courts of wrongly
assuming that there cannot be sexual tension when an employee sees
a same-sex customer naked, and deferring to the customer preference
for same-sex service on that basis. Although this represents an
incomplete picture of why courts have been so deferential to this
BFOQ—it seems unlikely, for instance, that courts are focused on
sexual attraction or tension when they defer to laboring women’s
desire for a female nurse—it is certainly a piece of the puzzle.
Not only does the physical privacy BFOQ preference dovetail
with an ingrained social convention, to the point where it strikes
courts as a need, but there is also an argument that the burden it
imposes with respect to sex is not unacceptably large. Although the
226. Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1421 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citing
Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122, 1132 (S.D. Va. 1982); and then citing Fesel
v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (D. Del. 1978)).
227. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978); cf.
Mary Alex Bernard, Where Did All the Male Ob-Gyns Go?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 29,
2018), http://www2.philly.com/philly/health/obgyn-obstetrics-women-men-doctors-decline20180829.html [https://perma.cc/VK3G-MP8V] (noting that “57 percent of active ob-gyns
were men” in 2008).
228. Yuracko, supra note 7, at 195.
229. See Ben-Asher, supra note 219, at 1225 (“The same-sex privacy exception often
presumes heterosexuality . . . .”); Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90
WASH. L. REV. 1167, 1192 (2015); Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the
Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1287 (2003).
230. Ben-Asher, supra note 219, at 1225.
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physical privacy preference definitely results in individual harms,
there is a “symmetry of exclusion” here, as Yuracko puts it.231 She
explains, “[t]here is at least a theoretical parity to sex-based hiring on
behalf of privacy: while women may be denied certain jobs to protect
men’s privacy, men will be denied the same range of jobs to protect
women’s privacy.”232 Of course, this may not hold true in practice. If,
for instance, women are more concerned about physical privacy in
certain situations than men are, there may still be a differential
burden in the aggregate. Similarly, as Yuracko points out, there are
some jobs where the “customers” are exclusively or mostly of one
sex.233 At least theoretically, however, there is some opportunity for
distributional parity. And, of course, there is a limited universe of
jobs that involve seeing naked customers.
Because courts consistently defer to the physical privacy
preference once customer nudity is involved, this Article classifies the
preference as strongly preferred.
C.

Psychological Comfort with the Same Sex

As we have seen, the story changes dramatically when customer
nudity drops out of the picture. Once a preference for same-gender
service or care cannot be framed as a desire for physical privacy from
the opposite sex—and instead rests on psychological comfort with the
same sex (sometimes referred to as “therapeutic privacy”)—much of
the judicial deference dissolves and the BFOQ defense is rejected.
Although the psychological comfort preference occasionally gets
deference, it is the most weakly preferred preference in the hierarchy.
Ironically, some of the physical privacy cases are themselves
really more about psychological comfort than physical modesty.234 In
particular, many articles about women’s preferences for female OBGYNs indicate that for those women who do prefer female OBGYNs (slightly over half of all American women, according to one
recent meta-analysis),235 the desire comes not from unease about
having male doctors examine their bodies but from a greater comfort
231. Yuracko, supra note 7, at 181.
232. Id. (footnote omitted).
233. Id. (providing the example of working in an OB-GYN unit).
234. See generally Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OB-GYN: A Proposal
for Expansion of the Privacy BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
357 (2004) (discussing the reasons for preferences for female OB-GYNs and the legal
ramifications of those reasons).
235. Kyle J. Tobler, et al., Gender Preference of the Obstetrician Gynecologist Provider:
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 127 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY (SUPP.) 43S,
43S (2016).
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level in discussing intimate topics like sex drive.236 Relatedly, some
women believe that female OB-GYNs can better appreciate their
specific concerns about issues like menstruation, childbirth, and
menopause, given their shared experience.237 All-female OB-GYN
practices sometimes market themselves along precisely those lines.238
Analogous psychological comfort preferences are also expressed
by men. A January 2018 New York Times article about the increase in
male nurses described the physical and psychological privacy interests
that can lead male patients to prefer male nurses in certain
situations.239 One male student nurse at a VA hospital, for example,
stated that “I work on this floor with people who just had urology
surgery or amputations, and they have told me that when I come in
the room and shut the door behind me, they feel more understood
and can drop the tough guy attitude.”240 Another article described
men’s greater comfort level with male healthcare providers for certain
forms of plastic surgery, such as penile enlargement.241
Somewhat surprisingly, there have not been many legal
challenges to preferential hiring of female OB-GYNs, the most wellknown example of this phenomenon. The only decision is Veleanu v.
Beth Israel Medical Center,242 which involved the related question of
whether a medical practice’s policy of accommodating patients’
requests to see female OB-GYNs amounted to discrimination against
the male plaintiff OB-GYN.243 The court held that it did not, citing
the labor nurse cases and stating that “female patients may have a
legitimate privacy interest in seeking to have female doctors perform
their gynecological examinations.”244 But as more such challenges are
236. Waldman, supra note 234, at 379–80.
237. Id. at 379.
238. See, e.g., All About Women - Tower Health Medical Group, TOWER HEALTH,
https://reading.towerhealth.org/locations/profile/?id=329 [http://perma.cc/98VT-T2C4]. One
Pennsylvania practice’s website, for example, states:
Just like their patients, All About Women providers are are [sic] mothers,
daughters, sisters, wives, and friends. As women, they too understand the joy of
childbirth and life’s milestones experienced by women of all ages. That personal
insight gives them a unique approach to treating patients and providing the best in
women’s healthcare.
Id.
239.
B1.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Claire Cain Miller, The Time Is Ripe for Male Nurses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2018, at
Id.
See Abby Ellin, Refuge in the Company of Men, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2017, at D8.
No. 98 CIV. 7455(VM), 2000 WL 1400965 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000).
Id. at *8.
Id.
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brought, it is a safe prediction that the physical privacy argument will
carry the laboring oar for the defense, even though psychological
comfort may be a more accurate label for what is actually occurring.245
Why does a same-gender preference that is more about mind
than body get so much less deference? The easy answer is that, even
though the psychological comfort preference does align with certain
social conventions about male-female interactions, and thus the
threshold requirement is met, courts are much quicker to dismiss it as
a “mere preference” rather than a need. As noted above, for
example, the Hi 40 Corp. court was very skeptical of a diet center’s
defense that its almost exclusively female clientele expressed a strong
preference for discussing weight-loss and body-image concerns with
female counselors.246 The court acknowledged that customers were
actually expressing these sentiments but viewed them as irrelevant.247
Indeed, the court stated that it did “not accept the proposition that . . .
customers have a privacy interest that extends to the counseling
function,” because “real privacy interests . . . only extend to” the
physical concerns.248
But that doctrinal approach, of course, just begs the question of
why physical privacy preferences are so much more compelling to
courts. Here, Ben-Asher’s emphasis on the salience of body
stereotyping is particularly relevant. As Ben-Asher writes, courts
consistently reject division-of-labor stereotyping, i.e., differential
treatment stemming from traditional presumptions about “men’s
work” versus “women’s work.”249 But courts are more willing to
accept body stereotyping, i.e., differential treatment for male and
female bodies, on grounds that such stereotypes are linked to ‘“real’
biological differences” between men and women.250 Once there is no
customer nudity and the body is less salient, the cases seem to shift
from the favored body-stereotyping category into the disfavored
division-of-labor category.

245. See Paul-Emile, supra note 42, at 486 (stating that, “unlike the prototypical BFOQ
situation, the relationship between physician and patient in the hospital context is not
defined by issues of personal modesty but is instead fundamentally diagnostic and
therapeutic”).
246. EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301, 303, 305–06 (W.D. Mo. 1996).
247. See id. at 303, 305.
248. Id. at 304 (emphasis added); see also Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
1052, 1068 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that female sex may not be a BFOQ for a massage
therapist position because the massage did not involve complete nudity).
249. Ben-Asher, supra note 219, at 1190–92.
250. Id. at 1192.
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In addition to faring poorly on the need versus preference issue,
the psychological comfort preference prompts courts to express more
concern about the burden imposed on the disfavored employees.251
There are two likely reasons for this. First, the burden imposed by the
physical privacy preference is at least limited to the small universe of
occupations that involve seeing or touching a customer’s naked body.
Once psychological comfort enters the mix, courts may be worried
about the potential for a slippery slope. Second, although courts have
never articulated this, there may be some concern that this preference
will particularly favor women—i.e., that psychological comfort with
the same gender tends to be expressed more by female than male
customers. There is indeed some empirical support for this possible
concern, particularly with respect to therapist preference.252
That said, even here, courts will occasionally defer to the
preference. As discussed above, in Healey, the Third Circuit accepted
a psychiatric hospital’s argument that its children and adolescent
patients needed same-sex care because of both psychological
concerns (including the need for role modeling and greater comfort
discussing menstruation and sexuality) as well as physical concerns
(since young patients sometimes needed to be bathed).253 The court’s
extended discussion of the patients’ psychological interests here
suggests that it would have ruled this way even without the physical
bathing concern, but it is hard to know for sure.254
251. See, e.g., Hi 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. at 304–05 (minimizing the psychological
interest of the female customers and concluding that, “[o]n the other hand, the
employment restriction utilized by Physicians Weight Loss, namely the refusal to hire
male counselors, has a dramatic impact on the employment opportunity of male
applicants. . . . [T]he privacy interests of customers cannot be used to justify a policy of not
hiring male counselors because the minimal impact of male counselors on the privacy
interests of customers is outweighed by the substantial impact on the employment
opportunities of male applicants.”).
252. See, e.g., Sara J. Landes et al., Women’s Preference of Therapist Based on Sex of
Therapist and Presenting Problem: An Analog Study, 26 COUNSELLING PSYCHOL. Q. 330,
337 (2013) (surveying female college students and finding that “[e]ighty-seven percent of
the women surveyed preferred the female therapist, regardless of the presenting
problem”); Cynthia F. Pikus & Christopher L. Heavey, Client Preferences for Therapist
Gender, 10 J.C. STUDENT PSYCHOTHERAPY 35, 39 (1996) (surveying 116 college students
and finding that 56% of women preferred a female therapist while 58% of men had no
preference); Matthew B. Wintersteen, Janell L. Mensinger & Guy S. Diamond, Do
Gender and Racial Differences Between Patient and Therapist Affect Therapeutic Alliance
and Treatment Retention in Adolescents?, 36 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 400, 400
(2005) (summarizing research findings as indicating that “[g]enerally, female patients tend
to prefer female therapists”).
253. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133–34 (3d Cir. 1996).
254. Id. (stating that it had reached its BFOQ conclusion “due to both therapeutic and
privacy concerns”); see also Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573, 583–86 (7th Cir.
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Because courts only rarely defer to the preference for
psychological comfort with the same sex, this Article classifies the
preference as weakly preferred.
D. English-Only Environment
In light of courts’ skepticism toward customers’ psychological
privacy interests, the significant judicial deference to the next
customer preference—an English-only environment—is striking. This
preference enters through one opening—the business necessity
defense to disparate impact—and is often successful in court. Courts
typically accept that such policies have a disparate impact based on
national origin, but then conclude that the policies are justified by
business necessity because they respond to customer preference.
If this preference were limited to English-speaking customers’
desire for employees to speak English in their interactions with them,
it would be unsurprising that it fares so well. But the preference is
broader than that. In numerous cases, employers have said that
employees have to speak English whenever they are in the customers’
presence—and courts have been deferential.255
Once again, the above-described factors illuminate how courts
reach that result. As an initial matter, in keeping with the threshold
requirement described previously,256 courts view this preference as
2008) (accepting that same-sex juvenile counselors might be necessary during the daytime
shifts in order to perform the “direct role modeling/mentoring form of supervision” most
effectively, but rejecting the employer’s argument that this was necessary at night because
the juveniles were sleeping most of that time).
255. It is important to note, however, that courts are much less deferential when the
rule requires employees to speak English at all times, even outside customers’ presence.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(noting the distinction between rules that apply to all times and places and those that are
more limited). Regulations also differentiate between rules that require “employees to
speak only English at all times in the workplace,” which are viewed as presumptively
violating Title VII, and English-only rules that are applied “only at certain times,” which
can be permissible if “justified by business necessity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)–(b) (2018).
That said, the EEOC’s guidance expresses some skepticism even about the latter category
of cases. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NO. 915.005,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION § V(C)(3)(d)(2)
(2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/national-origin-guidance.cfm [http://perma.cc/
4GHL-GN5N] (“If coworkers or customers are concerned about exposure to languages
they do not understand, or about gossip in these languages, one approach is to address
these concerns on an individualized basis without resorting to language-restrictive policies.
A language-restrictive policy that has a disparate impact on a particular group cannot be
justified if an employer can effectively promote safe and efficient business operations
through a policy that does not disproportionately harm protected national origin groups.”
(footnotes omitted)).
256. See supra Part II.
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reasonable and not invidiously discriminatory. This is most clearly
illustrated by the Sephora case. In deferring to Sephora’s assertion
that customers preferred salespeople to speak English in their
presence, the court stated that “[h]elpfulness, politeness and
approachability . . . are central to the job of a sales employee at a
retail establishment, and are distinct from customers’ prejudices.”257
From there, the Sephora court quickly segued into elevating the
preference beyond a mere preference. Indeed, the Sephora court
suggested that the customer preference for an English-only
environment was not a preference, stating that “as we explained
above we do not believe Sephora’s justifications rest on customer
preference.”258 In other words, once the preference did not reflect a
prejudice, it was not even a “preference” at all.259
Particularly telling is that courts generally decline even to
evaluate whether customers actually feel disturbed by hearing
employees converse in languages other than English. In Kania v.
Archdiocese of Philadelphia,260 for instance, the district court deferred
to the archdiocese’s rule that employees could not speak Polish at all
during business hours, speculating that speaking a language other
than English could “alienat[e] . . . perhaps church members
themselves.”261 The Kania court’s speculation about church members’
reactions was not backed up by any evidence,262 and the Sephora
court specifically stated that none was needed: “Sephora need not
demonstrate that a particular percentage of customers’ opinions
corroborate its business judgment that certain behavior is impolite
and unhelpful. We ‘do[] not sit as a super-personnel department
. . . .’”263 This passage was later approvingly cited by Pacheco.264 In
short, courts are so willing to accept the validity of the potential
customer concern here that they somewhat take it on faith from the
employer.

257. EEOC v. Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added).
258. Id.
259. See id. Indeed, in the same discussion, the Sephora court reiterated that “[w]hen
salespeople speak in a language customers do not understand, the effects on helpfulness,
politeness and approachability are real and are not a matter of abstract preference.” Id.
(emphasis added).
260. 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
261. Id. at 731, 736.
262. Id.
263. Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (alteration in original) (quoting Scaria v. Rubin,
117 F.3d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1997)).
264. Pacheco v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 599, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Finally, courts are quick to dismiss any burden that limited
English-only rules impose on employees whose native language is not
English.265 Once again, as with the aesthetic appeal cases, there is a
lurking assumption that this is just about choice and that the plaintiffemployees are being unreasonable by objecting. “Kania admits that
she is bilingual,”266 the Kania court wrote. “Because she could have
readily complied with the English-only rule, it did not cause a legally
cognizable adverse impact . . . .”267 The Pacheco court similarly
reasoned that “[t]he alleged difficulty Plaintiff had in not lapsing into
Spanish is belied by Plaintiff’s testimony that he is fully bilingual in
English and Spanish,”268 and also pointed out that the plaintiff could
still speak Spanish outside of patients’ presence.269
An important parallel exists between courts’ deference to the
English-only preference and to many iterations of the aesthetic
appeal preference, particularly those that implicate race and ethnicity,
such as rules prohibiting dreadlocks. As Camille Gear Rich explains,
both categories involve employees’ “race/ethnicity performance,”
which she defines as “any behavior or voluntarily displayed attribute
which, by accident or design, communicates racial or ethnic identity
or status,” including hairstyle, language, and the like.270 Even though
the employees regard these choices as “an essential part of their racial
or ethnic identity,” Rich writes, courts view them as a “marginal
concern, beyond the scope of [Title VII’s] protections.”271 Indeed, as
this Article has shown, courts reach that conclusion through a twostep maneuver: viewing the applicable preference as a reasonable
desire for professionalism or even a virtual need, and then minimizing
the burden imposed by the preference on the affected employee.
Because courts consistently defer to the customer preference for
an English-only environment in their presence, this Article classifies
the preference as strongly preferred.
E.

Avoidance of Proselytization or Judgment

Although the English-only preference involves employees’
language outside the customer-employee interaction, the next
265. See, e.g., Kania, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
266. Id.
267. Id. (citing Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993)).
268. Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
269. Id. at 614.
270. Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1139–40 (2004).
271. Id. at 1136 (footnote omitted).
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preference implicates the customer-employee interaction itself. This
customer preference—not wanting to receive any proselytization or
judgment from employees—enters through one opening: the
reasonable accommodation/undue hardship limitation on employers’
obligation to accommodate their employees’ religious practices. And
it receives great deference here.
It is important to separate this preference from the related issue
of whether employers have to accommodate employees’ religious
views in ways that are invisible to the customer—such as, for instance,
reassigning job responsibilities so that the employee will not perform
certain duties or work at certain times.272 Those situations, too,
typically implicate questions of reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship (e.g., cost, burden on other employees, administrative
complications, and so on).273 This specific preference, however,
implicates a narrower question: whether an accommodation that will
cause potential customer offense imposes, by reason of that customer
offense, an undue hardship. As explained above, this can happen in
two situations: (1) the employee’s insistence on proselytizing to
customers or (2) the employee’s visible refusal to assist customers
with certain tasks due to religious objections.
In both situations, the court usually sides with the employer.
Courts generally view this interest as more than a mere preference;
indeed, in some situations where the religious expression itself
conveys prejudice, customers’ own legal rights can be at stake.274 Even
when they are not, courts quite clearly view the preference as
reasonable.275 Similarly, courts are comfortable with the burden that
this preference imposes on religious employees, often implying that
the employee is the one being unreasonable. In Bruff, for instance,
the Fifth Circuit stated—in rejecting a therapist’s request to counsel
only on topics that did not conflict with her religion—that “[a]n
employee has a duty to cooperate in achieving accommodation of his
or her religious beliefs, and must be flexible in achieving that end.”276
Similarly, in Anderson, the Seventh Circuit rejected an employee’s
272. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding, in a case involving police officer who was uncomfortable serving outside an
abortion clinic because of his Catholic pro-life beliefs, that it was a reasonable
accommodation to transfer him to a different district that did not include abortion clinics,
and that the employer did not have to provide him with his requested accommodation of
keeping him in the same district and exempting him from that assignment).
273. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 174–76.
275. See supra Section I.C.II.
276. Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 503 (5th Cir. 2001).
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claim that the employer had to let her say “Have a Blessed Day” to
all customers, emphasizing that the employer had done enough by
letting her use the phrase with colleagues and display religious objects
in her work area.277 The only such case that survived summary
judgment was Hellinger. Even there, however, the precise basis for
the court’s holding was unclear, and it seems to have been partially
based on the potential for an accommodation that would be invisible
(and thus inoffensive) to the customer.
Because courts almost always defer to the customer preference
not to be proselytized to or overtly judged by employees, this Article
classifies it as strongly preferred.278

277. Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 473–74, 477 (7th Cir.
2001).
278. That said, different outcomes would of course be reached under lawsuits arising
under state laws that address this issue and provide more protection. See supra note 184.
This Article’s focus, however, is on federal employment discrimination law.
Another interesting question is whether, in the aftermath of Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), courts will become more
deferential to claims for religious accommodation. There, the court ruled in favor of a
bakery owner who raised a free exercise claim after being sanctioned by the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission for refusing to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple,
therefore violating the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. Id. at 1725–26, 1732. The
Supreme Court’s precise holding was narrow in that it was based on purported hostility to
religion shown by certain members of the Commission, but it also indicated a general
solicitude for individuals like the baker. See id. at 1723–24, 1731.
However, although Masterpiece Cakeshop may prompt courts to become more
deferential to religious accommodation claims in the free exercise context, that is unlikely
to affect the Title VII employment discrimination context addressed by this Article. For
this Article’s purposes, the relevant scenario would be as follows: (1) a bakery owner hires
an employee who refuses to take an order from a same-sex couple for a wedding cake,
contrary to the bakery’s own policy; (2) the owner terminates the employee; (3) the
employee brings a Title VII lawsuit alleging that the employer failed to reasonably
accommodate his religion; and (4) the employer defends itself from the Title VII claim by
pointing to the customer preference for avoidance of proselytization or judgment.
In other words, our hypothetical bakery owner would argue that allowing a religious
employee to reject a same-sex couple’s wedding cake order would not be a reasonable
accommodation and would impose an undue hardship because of the likely customer
offense that would ensue. Given the very low threshold for undue hardship in the Title VII
religious discrimination context (anything more than a de minimis cost), it would be an
easy showing to make. See, e.g., Mihir Zaveri, Alaska Airlines Apologizes to Gay Couple
Asked to Move for Straight Couple, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/01/business/alaska-airline-apology-gay-couple-seats.html [http://perma.cc/668J-MAK8
(dark archive)] (describing the public furor against Alaska Airlines after an incident when a
gay couple on the plane was asked to move so that a straight couple could sit next to each
other). In short, for the outcomes to change materially here, Title VII’s undue hardship
standard would have to be substantially raised.
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Convenience

The convenience preference is only a minor player in the
preferred preference hierarchy. It usually functions as a supporting
preference for two of the strongly preferred preferences: physical
privacy
from
the
opposite
sex
and
avoidance
of
proselytization/judgment.
In the physical privacy context, convenience typically connects
with the question of whether employers can accommodate customers’
physical privacy preferences through careful scheduling of timing and
shifts. This arises in two settings: restrooms and nursing
homes/hospitals. Courts have generally suggested that, if such careful
scheduling can be easily accomplished, then that is the better
approach for satisfying the physical privacy preference (as opposed to
only hiring employees of one sex for the position).
On the other hand, if such scheduling would impose nontrivial
inconveniences on customers, then the sex BFOQ permits employers
to hire employees of one sex for the position. For example, in
Hernandez v. University of Saint Thomas,279 the district court accepted
the argument that having male custodians service women’s restrooms
might lead to inconveniences (because those restrooms would have to
be closed during the cleaning, leading to overcrowding in the other
bathrooms).280 The court thus rejected the employee’s motion for
summary judgment, suggesting that if at trial the university could
support its contention that “any alternatives to a sex-based policy
would significantly decrease the efficiency and the quality of custodial
operations,” then it could prevail on its BFOQ defense.281
A similar approach applies to customers’ preference to avoid
employees’ proselytization or judgment: if it is easy and inexpensive
to reassign duties to shield the customer from this experience, then
the reassignment is likely to be a reasonable accommodation.282
279. 793 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1992).
280. Id. at 218.
281. Id. (explaining that there was a genuine issue of fact as to how disruptive the
alternatives would be and stating that “[a]t some point, a high degree of added cost,
decreased cleanliness, or intrusion on privacy could undermine the central mission of the
enterprise”).
282. See Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
(suggesting that there needed to be a trial on whether the employer could accommodate,
without undue hardship, the religious employee’s desire not to sell condoms); cf.
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1998) (defining a reasonable
accommodation of religious beliefs as “one that ‘eliminates the conflict between
employment requirements and religious practices’” (quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986))).
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However, if such reassignment would materially inconvenience
customers—say, by requiring them to undergo a long wait for another
employee—employers are not required to take this approach. In
Noesen v. Medical Staffing Network,283 for instance, the Seventh
Circuit rejected the religious discrimination claim of a pharmacist
who was fired after refusing to play any role in helping customers who
were attempting to order birth control, including “even briefly talking
to customers seeking contraception.”284 The court accepted the
employer’s position that, “due to high caller volume [the plaintiff],
like all other staff, needed to answer the telephones.”285 Thus, just as
in the sex BFOQ situation, the convenience preference works with
the nonproselytization/judgment preference to create a successful
employer defense.
Unlike most of the other preferences, convenience is entirely a
matter of degree: a one-minute wait is obviously very different from a
twenty-minute wait, let alone a one-hour wait. The greater the
inconvenience, the more likely courts are to defer to the preference,
because then it seems closer to a need. Because the level of
preference deference here varies depending on the inconvenience
involved and its interaction with another preference, this Article
classifies the convenience preference as moderately preferred.
G. Diversity?
I conclude this section by considering a potential new preferred
preference: diversity. Customers—particularly large clients of law
firms—have increasingly expressed this preference in recent years in
regard to the composition of the team working on their matters.286 In
283. 232 F. App’x 581 (7th Cir. 2007).
284. Id. at 583–85.
285. Id. at 583–84 (“Wal-Mart contends, and we agree, that [the plaintiff’s] proposed
accommodation would impose an undue hardship. It is undisputed that Wal-Mart’s
relieving [the plaintiff] of all telephone and counter duties would have shifted his share of
initial customer contact to other pharmacy staff.”). Interestingly, here the employer
actually offered the employee the option of referring callers with birth control issues to
others, but the employee refused the offer and was only willing to place the customers on
an indefinite hold. Id. at 583. Thus, the court did not have to rule on whether, had the
employer not offered this accommodation, it would have been required to do so under
Title VII.
286. See Douglas E. Brayley & Eric S. Nguyen, Good Business: A Market-Based
Argument for Law Firm Diversity, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 25–28 (2009); Stacy Hawkins,
How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard: Mounting an Effective Title
VII Defense of the Commitment to Diversity in the Legal Profession, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
2457, 2460 (2015) (“[L]egal employers face increasing demands from external stakeholders
to produce demonstrable evidence of success in achieving these diversity goals.”);
Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in Law
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2017, Facebook announced that it would require “women and ethnic
minorities [to] account for at least 33 percent of law firm teams
working on its matters,”287 while HP announced that it would
withhold up to 10% of bills from firms that do not meet its diversity
criteria (which include a numerical minimum for how many female
and ethnically diverse attorneys must work on their matters).288
Corporations including MetLife,289 Microsoft,290 and Shell291 have
taken similar steps. Retired Federal District Judge Shira Scheindlin
recently wrote a New York Times op-ed encouraging other
Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1062 (2011); Clare Tower Putnam, Comment,
When Can a Law Firm Discriminate Among Its Own Employees to Meet a Client’s
Request? Reflections on the ACC’s Call to Action, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 657, 658
(2007); Lisa Kirby & Caren Ulrich Stacy, Client Call for Greater Diversity at Fever Pitch,
LAW.COM (July 17, 2017), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/07/17/client-call-forgreater-diversity-at-fever-pitch/ [https://perma.cc/8GHC-FJKH].
287. Ellen Rosen, Facebook Pushes Outside Law Firms on Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2017, at B2.
288. Letter from Kim M. Rivera, HP Chief Legal Officer, to Law Firm Partners (Feb.
8, 2017), http://www8.hp.com/us/en/images/Diversity_Holdback_Open_Letter_to_Law_
Firms_tcm245_2406164_tcm245_2403754_tcm245-2406164.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8EH-L98D]
(instructing all U.S.-based law firms with at least ten attorneys that, “[i]n order to comply
with the requirement, firms must field (i) at least one diverse Firm relationship partner,
regularly engaged with HP on billing and staffing issues; or (ii) at least one woman and
one racially/ethnically diverse attorney, each performing or managing at least 10% of the
billable hours worked on HP matters”).
289. Casey Sullivan, Deadline for Diversity Issued by Top MetLife Lawyer, BIG L. BUS.
(Apr. 3, 2017), https://biglawbusiness.com/deadline-for-diversity-issued-by-top-metlifelawyer/ [https://perma.cc/MAQ8-JBAH] (“[MetLife General Counsel] plans to give law
firms until June 2018 to present MetLife with a formal talent development plan that shows
how they will promote and retain diverse lawyers. If the plan is not acceptable the outside
law firm will have until December 2018 to revise its plan, although there will be no third
try after that.”).
290. Letter from Brad Smith, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corp.,
to Microsoft’s Premier Preferred Provider Firms (July 31, 2015) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Brad Smith, Announcing the Next Generation of Microsoft’s Law
Firm Diversity Program: Working Towards a More Diverse and Inclusive Legal Profession,
MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (Aug. 4, 2015), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2015/
08/04/announcing-the-next-generation-of-microsofts-law-firm-diversity-program-workingtowards-a-more-diverse-and-inclusive-legal-profession/
[https://perma.cc/4HQQ-F6KF]
(describing bonus structure of up to 2% of the legal fees billed to the company “based on
their performance in increasing diversity in three aspects of a firm’s leadership. . . . (1)
leading the management of the law firm; (2) leading the law firm’s relationship with
Microsoft; and (3) leading work on Microsoft’s legal matters” (footnote omitted)).
291. See, e.g., Mary Flood, Shell Lawyer: There’s More to Diversity Than Lip Service,
HOUS. CHRON. (May 13, 2007), https://www.chron.com/business/article/Shell-lawyer-There-smore-to-diversity-than-lip-1800430.php [https://perma.cc/2X8D-2EFX (staff-uploaded archive)]
(describing the push by Shell’s general counsel to “insist[] on diversity and inclusiveness in
her workplace and the places she hired,” such as requiring Shell’s law firms “to account . . .
for how many female and minority lawyers work on Shell business, for how many hours
they work and what they do”).
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corporations to similarly “demand[] that the firms representing them
field a diverse team of lawyers.”292 The preference is usually justified
as being connected to both work performance and societal
improvement.293 But can employers comply with such demands and
explicitly take sex and race into account when staffing matters
without running afoul of Title VII? In other words, can diversity
become another preferred preference that successfully provides a
defense to an employment discrimination claim?
It is important to note both the overlap—and the key
distinction—between the diversity preference and some of the
physical privacy and psychological comfort cases discussed above,
such as Wade, Little Forest, and Southwood. There, the employers
sought to have diverse workforces (i.e., a male/female mix) present at
all times so that they could satisfy their individual customers’
preferences. But in those cases, the employers were responding to
their customers’ preferences for same-sex service or care. The
ultimate effect was a diverse workforce, because the employers
needed male employees for the male customers and female
employees for the female customers. But that was not because any
individual customer actually sought diversity—quite the contrary.
Here, by contrast, the customer itself is requesting to be served by a
diverse team of employees.
As an initial matter, sometimes Title VII’s antidiscrimination
provisions may not even be violated by creating employee teams that
respond to customers’ diversity preferences. It is true that Title VII
makes it unlawful both (1) to “discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin”294 and (2) to “limit, segregate, or classify his
292. Shira A. Scheindlin, Opinion, Female Lawyers Can Talk, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 2017, at A23. Most recently, prodded by client Shonda Rhimes, Hollywood agency ICM
Partners “pledged to reach 50-50 gender parity by the year 2020,” meaning that “in two
years’ time, women will represent half the agency’s partnership, half its department heads
and half its board of directors.” Rebecca Sun, ICM Partners Pledges to Reach 50-50
Gender Parity by 2020 (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 6, 2017, 6:30 A.M.),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/icm-partners-pledges-reach-50-50-gender-parityby-2020-1064634 [https://perma.cc/PC6W-E4DY].
293. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 287 (quoting Facebook’s General Counsel who stated
that “[f]irms typically do what their clients want . . . . And we want to see them win our
cases and create opportunities for women and people of color”); Letter from Kim M.
Rivera, supra note 288 (“Our vision at HP is to create technology that makes the world a
better place for everyone, everywhere. To achieve that vision, business leaders must
represent the diversity of our customers and stakeholders.”).
294. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
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employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”295 Both of these provisions are
broadly implicated when an employer takes any of these protected
characteristics into account when staffing matters. But limiting
constructions apply to each of them.
Under the first provision, it must be shown that an employer
took a materially adverse employment action against the employee,
rather than something that was de minimis or only temporary in
effect.296 In particular, courts have held that lateral transfers—which
seem roughly analogous to the re-staffing of particular client
matters—are not necessarily adverse employment actions under Title
VII, unless they result in a loss of prestige or diminished options for
advancement.297
Similarly, as to the second provision, the Seventh Circuit recently
held that it is not enough to show that the employer took an action to
classify employees based on race (or another protected
characteristic). The plaintiff must also show that the classification
either deprived, or at least had the tendency to deprive, a person of
employment opportunities.298
Thus, if an employer creates diverse work teams in a way that
ensures that all employees are receiving equal employment
opportunities, there may not be a Title VII issue at all. That is
because it will be difficult for the plaintiff-employee to prove either a
materially adverse employment action (under the first provision) or
the tendency for a deprivation of employment opportunities (under
the second provision). The more diverse an employer’s workforce is,
the more easily it will be able to accomplish this, since the various
client teams will likely each be diverse without active intervention or
manipulation.
295. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
296. See, e.g., McMillian v. Potter, 130 F. App’x 793, 796–97 (6th Cir. 2005); Bowman v.
Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2000).
297. See, e.g., Stewart v. Union Cty. Bd. of Educ., 655 F. App’x 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2016);
Czekalski v. LaHood, 589 F.3d 449, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub.
Schs., 709 F. Supp. 2d 628, 647 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
298. See EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 860 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the
EEOC’s argument that “any action to limit, segregate, or classify employees because of
race automatically violates” this section, and reasoning that “[i]f it’s not necessary to show
that the challenged employment action ‘deprive[d] or tend[ed] to deprive’ the employee of
employment opportunities ‘or otherwise adversely affect[ed] his status as an employee,’
what is the point of this statutory language?”) (alterations in original)), reh’g denied, 875
F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 2017).
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In other situations, though, an employee may be able to show at
least the tendency for a deprivation and/or the potential for a
materially adverse result. After all, some of the most high-profile
companies are the ones currently expressing this preference—and
their matters could arguably present the most career-enhancing
opportunities.299 If an employer’s demographic makeup largely
consists of nondiverse employees, then its diverse employees would
likely get a disproportionate opportunity to work on those desirable
matters in order to satisfy those clients’ diversity requirements. Thus,
at some point courts may well have to decide whether the diversity
preference can create a valid defense.
So far, there is little precedent here that is directly on point. As
Deborah Rhode has noted (in the specific context of analyzing how
law firms should work toward diversity), “[w]hat further complicates
the legal landscape is the uncertain status of preferential treatment
that disfavors white men. . . . Client pressures typically are not a
justification for such preferential treatment.”300 Similarly, Patrick
Shin, Devon Carbado, and Mitu Gulati write:
Is there a tension between firms expressing an interest in
pursuing diversity, on the one hand, and the space they have to
do so, on the other, under current antidiscrimination law?
Arguably, there is. . . . There is little doubt that at some point in
the near future, the Supreme Court will weigh in on this
question.301
For sex-based decisions in staffing matters, there are two
potential openings through which the diversity preference could
plausibly enter: the BFOQ opening and the equal burdens opening.
The latter seems more promising. As discussed above, the sex-based
customer preferences that have successfully entered the BFOQ
opening implicate privacy, particularly physical privacy. The physical
privacy concern is clearly not applicable in situations involving the
above types of requests by corporations for diverse teams. Moreover,
employers would not be able to argue that female sex is a BFOQ for
doing the actual work for a particular client, but would instead have
299. See supra notes 287–93 and accompanying text.
300. Rhode, supra note 286, at 1068 (footnote omitted).
301. Patrick Shin, Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Diversity Feedback Loop, 2014
U. CHI. L.F. 345, 345–46 (2014). Kingsley Browne also supports this proposition by stating,
“[g]iven the widespread emphasis on diversity and the apparently common use of racial
preferences to achieve it, there is surprisingly little case law under Title VII addressing the
use of preferences outside the remedial context.” Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII and
Diversity, 14 NEV. L.J. 806, 807 (2014).
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to argue that having a female member of the larger team is necessary.
This, too, makes the BFOQ defense an awkward fit here. Under
existing precedent, it would be difficult for a law firm to argue that
female sex is a BFOQ, say, for being a member of the team working
on Facebook’s matters but not Twitter’s, simply on the grounds that
Facebook has a diversity requirement while Twitter does not.302
There is, however, some potential for the equal burdens opening
if courts are willing to expand it beyond its usual context of sexdifferentiated appearance policies. Like the employers in Craft and
Jespersen, a defendant-employer could argue that satisfying these
client preferences does not impose a greater burden on males than
females. After all, men and women can still be staffed on any
particular matter in equal numbers. Indeed, so far, all of these
quantitative requirements still leave room for men to hold the
majority of positions, making it even harder for men to argue that
they are being unequally burdened. Moreover, except for situations
where a client team is reshuffled midstream in response to a client’s
diversity preference, it may be hard for any one employee to prove
that he necessarily would have been staffed on the matter absent the
diversity preference. Thus, the equal burdens opening could
theoretically work here, in concert with the above-described
requirement that the plaintiff-employee prove a materially adverse
action or the tendency for a deprivation of opportunities in the first
place. It is not clear, however, that courts would be willing to apply
this opening to sex-differentiated treatment that goes beyond
differential appearance policies. As discussed above, courts tend to be
much more deferential to sex-differentiation that relates to bodies as
opposed to division of labor.303
For race/ethnicity-based staffing decisions, the openings largely
disappear. The BFOQ defense does not apply to race or color, and
there is no equal burdens doctrine for race/ethnicity-differentiated

302. See, e.g., id. at 822 (“[T]he BFOQ cases strongly suggest that an employer’s desire
for diversity would not be a sufficient justification for preferences even if limited only to
those classes for which the BFOQ defense is potentially available under Title VII (sex,
religion, and national origin).”). But see Ernest F. Lidge III, Law Firm Employment
Discrimination in Case Assignments at the Client’s Insistence: A Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 159, 176 (2005) (arguing that the BFOQ defense should
allow law firms to satisfy individualized client requests for attorneys of a particular sex,
given the intimacy of the attorney-client relationship); Deborah C. Malamud, The Strange
Persistence of Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 21 (2015)
(suggesting, without further discussion, that “[t]o a limited extent, employers can use [the
BFOQ defense] to justify diversity-based hiring” for sex, but not “race or color”).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 249–50.
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policies. The business necessity defense to disparate impact claims is
also inapplicable, because that only applies to facially neutral policies
as opposed to policies that explicitly take protected characteristics
into account.
The one remaining avenue comes from a source outside the
realm of customer preference openings: affirmative action doctrine.
The Supreme Court has indeed indicated that Title VII leaves some
room for employers to engage in voluntary affirmative action
programs “designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories.”304 However, diversity
rationales for affirmative action have not been explicitly endorsed
outside the educational setting. Moreover, to the extent that such
staffing approaches are used only for specific clients and tailored to
those clients’ particular numerical requests, the affirmative action
defense—which presumes a generally applicable policy—is a
particularly awkward fit.305 Additionally, running throughout the
affirmative action case law is disapproval of quotas or other
quantitative requirements—the very type of numerical preference
that clients are now expressing.
Moving beyond the doctrinal challenges, the factors that this
Article has used to unpack when and why courts are deferential to
customer preferences also indicate some roadblocks. First, although
the diversity preference does not seem invidiously discriminatory—
quite the contrary—it is not the same type of longstanding, ingrained
social convention implicated by the other preferred preferences.
Indeed, clients seem to be demanding diverse teams precisely because
employers are not always providing them on their own. Indeed, rather
than reaffirming the default norm, these overt diversity policies seem
304. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
305. See Browne, supra note 301, at 807–08 (arguing that current affirmative action
doctrine would not justify such policies); Corey A. Ciocchetti & John Holcomb, The
Frontier of Affirmative Action: Employment Preferences & Diversity in the Private
Workplace, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 283, 347 (2010) (predicting that the Supreme Court would
“strike down a voluntary, forward-looking, diversity-based workplace affirmative action
plan”); Malamud, supra note 302, at 23 (viewing it as unlikely that the Supreme Court will
see Grutter’s affirmative action doctrine “as creating a safe haven for corporate diversity
practice”); Rhode, supra note 286, at 1068–69 (“Although the Supreme Court has
narrowly upheld considerations based on diversity in educational admission programs so
long as they do not involve fixed quotas, it is by no means clear how far this rationale
would extend to employment contexts.”); Shin et al., supra note 301, at 345–46 (“[I]t is
uncertain whether Title VII permits race-conscious hiring measures that seek to reap the
workplace benefits of racial diversity, especially if such measures do not fit the mold of
traditional affirmative action plans designed to remedy ‘manifest imbalances’ associated
with past discrimination.”); Putnam, supra note 286, at 675.
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to be trying to change the default. This differentiates the diversity
preference from all of the other preferred preferences discussed
above. That said, courts may be impressed that this is the one
preference whose very goal is to promote equal employment
opportunity, rather than being neutral (or worse) on the subject.
Second, it is difficult to view the diversity preference for diverse
teams as an actual need—particularly because it is new and only a
handful of clients are expressing it. On the other hand, judges may be
sympathetic to the diversity preference and find it reasonable. Indeed,
some judges have recently been taking their own steps to increase
diversity among the lawyers who have speaking roles in the
courtroom, although they have not gone as far as imposing specific
quantitative requirements.306
Finally, there may be real judicial concern about the burden that
employers’ satisfaction of these customer preferences could impose
on nondiverse employees. Recall that in many of the above-described
situations, employees at least had the theoretical option to comply
with the preference—whether by wearing makeup, removing
dreadlocks, exclusively speaking English at work, refraining from
proselytization, or the like. Here, the disfavored employee has no
option. In that way, the situation is more like the same-sex privacy
preferences, where we saw that unless customer nudity was present,
306. Beyond retired Judge Scheindlin’s op-ed, at least two federal judges have recently
amended their own courtroom rules to give junior attorneys more opportunities and
incentives to speak in court in the hope of advancing the professional development of
female and ethnically diverse attorneys. See Alan Feuer, A Federal Judge’s New Rule: Let
More Women Argue Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2017, at A16 (discussing Eastern District
of New York Judge Jack Weinstein’s new courtroom rules, which he implemented after
speaking with Judge Scheindlin and learning more about the underrepresentation of
female attorneys and ethnically diverse attorneys in the courtroom); see also HON. ANN
DONNELLY, INDIVIDUAL PRACTICES AND RULES 3, https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/
AMD-MLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4AK-L328]
(“The participation of relatively inexperienced attorneys in all court proceedings—
including but not limited to pre-motion conferences, pre-trial conference, hearings on
discovery motions and dispositive motions, and examination of witnesses at trial—is
strongly encouraged.”); HON. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL MOTION PRACTICE OF
JUDGE JACK B. WEINSTEIN, https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/JBW-MLR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SQB3-KLEK] (“Junior members of legal teams representing clients are
invited to argue motions they have helped prepare and to question witnesses with whom
they have worked. . . . This court is amenable to permitting a number of lawyers to argue
for one party if this creates an opportunity for a junior lawyer to participate.”); Kathryn
Rubino, Hero Federal Judge Takes Steps to Increase Meaningful Experience for Diverse
Lawyers, ABOVE THE L. (Aug. 24, 2017, 3:29 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/08/
hero-federal-judge-takes-steps-to-increase-meaningful-experience-for-diverse-lawyers/?rf=1
[https://perma.cc/4PGP-5QMB] (noting that, in addition to Judge Weinstein, Eastern
District of New York Judge Ann M. Donnelly has taken a similar approach).
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courts were largely unwilling to overlook the burden imposed on the
disfavored sex.
In sum, an expanded version of the equal burdens opening could
theoretically work for the diversity preference. Courts may be willing
to expand the equal burdens doctrine beyond the context of sexdifferentiated appearance standards—most likely for sex-based
staffing decisions, and perhaps even to ethnicity-based staffing
decisions too. But this would require a significant expansion, leading
me to predict that diversity is likely to become—at most—a weakly
preferred preference. In the next part, I suggest a new way of thinking
about customer preferences, one that—among other things—points
toward a better, and more legally defensible, way for employers to
satisfy individual clients’ diversity preferences.
III. RETHINKING PREFERENCE DEFERENCE
Looking at the preferred preferences collectively is illuminating.
It makes clear that the doctrinal opening through which the customer
preference enters is less important than the substance of the
preference itself. The aesthetic appeal preference, for instance, gets
roughly the same treatment whether it appears in the equal burdens
opening, the job-related and consistent with business necessity
opening, or the undue hardship opening. Moreover, legal principles
migrate across the customer preference openings. Courts sometimes
invoke BFOQ language when analyzing disparate impact and failureto-accommodate claims,307 and they sometimes employ reasonable
accommodation language when coming up with disparate impact
remedies.308
It is not surprising that, despite the customer preference
openings’ different formulations, they end up functioning similarly.
The openings all sit at the tension between two different models of
antidiscrimination law, persuasively described by Robert Post as the
“dominant conception” and the “sociological account.”309 The
“dominant
conception”
suggests
that
the
purpose
of
antidiscrimination law is to remove all consideration of forbidden
307. See, e.g., Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(justifying ruling against bearded religious employee on grounds that “[s]ome courts have
found that clean-shavenness is a bona fide occupational qualification in certain
businesses” (citing EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (N.D. Ga. 1981); and then
citing In re E. Greyhound Lines Div. of Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y.
1970))), aff’d, 31 F’ App’x 740 (2d Cir. 2002).
308. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993).
309. Post, supra note 198, at 31.
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characteristics like race or sex—to “require[] employers to regard
their employees as though they did not display socially powerful and
salient attributes, because these attributes may induce irrational and
prejudiced judgments.”310 By contrast, the “sociological account” does
not expect or require such blindness, which Post views as
unrealistic.311 Post further explains:
The dominant conception of American antidiscrimination
law aspires to suppress categories of social judgment that are
deemed likely to be infected with prejudice. . . . There is thus a
strong impulse within the dominant perspective to imagine the
law as standing in a neutral space outside of history and of the
contingent social practices of which history is comprised. . . .
Because the dominant conception offers an implausible
story about the actual shape of antidiscrimination law, I have
proposed an alternative perspective, which we may call the
sociological account, in which antidiscrimination law is
understood as a social practice that acts on other social
practices. . . .
In contrast to the dominant conception, the sociological
account accepts the inevitability of social practices. But
precisely because of this acceptance, the account requires that
principles be articulated that will guide and direct the
transformation of social practices. Because the dominant
conception seeks entirely to transcend and eliminate social
practices, it has not fully developed such principles.312
The customer preference openings provide important support for
Post’s view that the sociological account better captures how
antidiscrimination law actually works. After all, under the dominant
conception, customer preferences should generally not be able to
enter these openings at all. Moreover, each of the openings provides a
mechanism through which the sociological approach can operate by
facilitating a discussion about which preferences deserve to enter the
openings and which should be ignored.
Because of courts’ loyalty to the dominant conception, however,
they struggle with how to use these openings. They state that
310. Id. at 11–12, 30.
311. See id. at 17, 31 (“Law is made by the very persons who participate in the social
practices that constitute race, gender, and beauty. It would be astonishing, therefore, if
American antidiscrimination law could transcend these categories, if it could operate in a
way that rendered them truly irrelevant.”).
312. Id. at 30–31.
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customer preferences are irrelevant while simultaneously deferring to
some; and they frequently deny that the preferences are burdensome
even when they are. Essentially, courts are trying to reconcile the
cognitive dissonance between the theory that customer preferences
should be irrelevant within antidiscrimination law and the reality that
they still play a role (and indeed, that antidiscrimination law’s
structure itself provides opportunities for them to do so).
That blurred reasoning, in turn, has consequences for
development of the law and for judicial legitimacy itself. For example,
as Post observes:
[A]n approach that accepted the insights of the sociological
account would have invited the court in Craft explicitly to state
and defend the grounds for its conclusions, and this in turn
would have facilitated public review and critique. Such an
approach would thus render decisions such as Craft far more
accountable for their actual judgments.313
But instead of doing that, the Craft court oversimplified and distorted
the case, suggesting that it was just about the television station’s equal
expectations of male and female newscasters to present a professional
appearance.314 Similarly, the Jespersen court recast the casino’s
explicitly sex-differentiated appearance policy as “for the most part
unisex,” even though its requirement that female employees wear full
makeup was the very focus of the claim.315
So, what should courts do instead? First, they should be more
explicit about their reasoning. Moreover, they should recognize that
the considerations that are intuitively shaping their decisions—such as
the strength of customer sentiment, and how burdensome it is on
employees—are not as objective as they might seem. Rather, these
considerations are inevitably viewed through the lens of judges’ own
life experiences. Preferences that accord with majority practice, and
with judges’ own conceptions of what seems reasonable, are most
likely to strike judges as weighty and/or nonburdensome (because
complying with them is the “reasonable,” “professional” thing to do).
313. Id. at 32.
314. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985).
315. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (“[Harrah’s] policy does not single out Jespersen. It applies to all of the bartenders,
male and female. It requires all of the bartenders to wear exactly the same uniforms while
interacting with the public in the context of the entertainment industry. It is for the most
part unisex, from the black tie to the non-skid shoes. . . . The only evidence in the record to
support the stereotyping claim is Jespersen’s own subjective reaction to the makeup
requirement.”).
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The cases involving the aesthetic appeal and English-only preferences
especially illustrate this phenomenon, with women and
ethnic/religious minorities often faring poorly.316 And of course,
because these factors are not explicitly articulated by courts in the
first place but are just lurking in the background, it is even easier for
inconsistencies and biases to creep in.
A better approach is to acknowledge that these customer
preference openings exist, that none of them are limited to actual
necessity, and that there is going to be some inevitable line drawing
about which preferences get to enter and which do not. To aid that
line drawing, this Article proposes two key guideposts: (1) a contextspecific look at whether the preference relates to the employee’s
actual performance of the specific job and (2) a broad look at the
extent to which the preference limits equal employment opportunity
in the workplace. These guideposts are at least somewhat more
objective than the factors described above. More importantly, they
better reflect what antidiscrimination law is trying to achieve.
A. Actual Performance of the Job
The first guidepost that this Article proposes—whether the
preference relates to the employee’s actual performance of the
specific job—may sound familiar. It echoes the essence of the
business standard that courts have articulated for the BFOQ
defense.317 To be sure, “essence of the business” is not a self-defining
term, nor is this Article’s proposed standard. As Yuracko has written,
a business’s essence can be defined by employers, by customers, by
some sort of inherent meaning, or by some sort of shared meaning.318
Similarly, “actual job performance” can be defined expansively (by,
for instance, encompassing even how the employee looks while
performing the job) or narrowly (by focusing only on the
performance of the substantive job responsibilities). I strongly
advocate a narrow interpretation of this guidepost. Courts should
316. See Rich, supra note 270, at 1194 (arguing that modern Title VII cases are
characterized by “discrimination by proxy,” in which an ostensibly neutral policy
specifically names and prohibits cultural practices associated with particular racial/ethnic
minorities); see also Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently
White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2029 (1995) (describing the
phenomenon of “[t]ransparently white decisionmaking,” which “consists of the
unconscious use of criteria of decision that are more strongly associated with whites than
with nonwhites”). Flagg argues that “the imposition of transparently white norms amounts
to a requirement that nonwhite employees assimilate to whites’ cultural expectations.” Id.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31.
318. Yuracko, supra note 7, at 160–66.
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limit it to the employee’s performance of specific tasks for the
customer.
Of the six preferred preferences, four typically implicate such
performance: the preference for physical privacy from the opposite
sex; the preference for psychological comfort with the same sex; the
preference not to receive proselytization or judgment; and the
convenience preference. All of those preferences, in different ways,
involve the core interaction/transaction between employee and
customer. The physical privacy preference involves situations where
the employee, in performing the job itself, is seeing or even touching
the naked body of the customer/client. The non-proselytization
preference involves the substance of the employee’s words to the
customer/client, simultaneous to the employee’s performance of the
job. Indeed, in the case of counselors and therapists, the
proselytization is sometimes occurring as part of the job. Recall that
in Knight, the employees were not asking to be exempted from
counseling certain clients. Rather, they were arguing that Title VII
protected their affirmative right to proselytize to all clients.319
Convenience, too, is connected to the core task: it is about how
quickly the task at hand gets done for the customer.
The most complex one is the same-sex psychological comfort
preference, since it is less measurable and bounded than the other
three, in which courts can look to purely objective markers—
respectively, whether pure nudity is involved, whether the employee
is vocally proselytizing or expressing negative judgment toward
customers, and the length of time that the customer is being
inconvenienced. Because certain therapeutic jobs do implicate
gender-related psychological privacy interests, however, courts should
be more open to this preference. A number of psychological studies
indicate not only that clients, particularly women, often prefer
therapists of the same sex,320 but also that same-sex matches can
actually lead to better therapeutic outcomes.321 The research is
319. See Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
supra Section I.C.2.
320. See supra note 252.
321. Loree A. Johnson & Benjamin E. Caldwell, Race, Gender, and Therapist
Confidence: Effects on Satisfaction with the Therapeutic Relationship in MFT, 39 AM. J.
FAM. THERAPY 307, 315 (2011) (finding that “when therapists and clients matched in
terms of gender, clients reported significantly greater satisfaction with the therapeutic
relationship”); Landes et al., supra note 252, at 337 (“[Female p]articipants reported lower
anticipated comfort self-disclosing to a male therapist and lower anticipated comfort selfdisclosing when the hypothetical presenting problem they were considering for therapy
was female sex-specific. These findings extend previous literature showing that women
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certainly mixed on this, and other factors matter too.322 It does,
however, suggest that courts are being too simplistic in dismissing this
interest as necessarily less weighty than the physical privacy
interest.323 Again, none of this is to suggest that the same-sex
psychological comfort preference is a need. It is not. But there is no
principled basis for courts to treat it so much more skeptically and as
less “real” than the other preferred preferences. Indeed, in jobs that
implicate both physical privacy and psychological comfort, such as
OB-GYNs, customers/patients often emphasize the psychological
reasons over the physical privacy ones for preferring a same-sex
provider.324
The diversity preference can also directly relate to the
performance of actual job responsibilities. Much research is being
done on the issue of how diversity affects group performance in the
employment setting, and the results so far are varied. On the one
prefer a female therapist.”); Wintersteen et al., supra note 252, at 405 (focusing on
adolescents and finding that, “[f]rom a patient perspective, a gender match with the
therapist facilitated alliance development, and gender-matched dyads were more likely to
complete two thirds of treatment”). A related question, as noted above, is whether and
how employment discrimination doctrine will respond to the growing evidence that having
a doctor of the same race can lead to better medical outcomes for racial-minority patients.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., Adrian J. Blow, Tina M. Timm & Ronald Cox, The Role of the Therapist
in Therapeutic Change: Does Therapist Gender Matter?, 20 J. FEMINIST FAM. THERAPY
66, 78 (2008) (concluding that there are “mixed findings” on whether gender predicts
outcomes in therapy, noting that “there do not appear to be big differences between male
and female therapists, except in working with adolescents (where [male] therapist gender
seems particularly pertinent for engaging adolescent boys in treatment and keeping them
engaged)” (emphasis added)); Caron Zlotnick, Irene Elkin & M. Tracie Shea, Does the
Gender of a Patient or the Gender of a Therapist Affect the Treatment of Patients with
Major Depression?, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 655, 657–58 (1998) (finding
that “among depressed patients, a male or female therapist, or same- versus oppositegender pairing, was not significantly related to level of depression at termination, to
attrition rates, or to the patient’s perceptions of the therapist’s degree of empathy early in
treatment and at termination,” but noting that the therapists in this study had been
“carefully selected, received specific training, and attained a certified level of
competence,” which may have left “limited opportunity for differences to emerge between
male and female therapists in their attitude and behavior toward patients”).
323. Particularly ironic, in light of the Hi 40 Corp. court’s dismissal of female
customers’ preferences for discussing their weight loss and body image with female
counselors, is an article suggesting that therapists’ gender may be especially relevant for
bulimic patients. See Natalia Zunino, Ellen Agoos & William N. Davis, The Impact of
Therapist Gender on the Treatment of Bulimic Women, 10 INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS
253, 255 (1991) (suggesting, albeit without an actual experiment, that a therapist’s female
gender may be particularly important in working with bulimic patients because that work
implicates body image problems, mother-daughter relationships, ambivalent feelings
about gender identity, and the need for a role model).
324. See Waldman, supra note 234, at 379–80.
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hand, workforce diversity can yield more creativity and expanded
perspectives; on the other, it can bring friction, especially when it is
not well managed.325 In addition to these general results, there is also
interesting anecdotal and empirical evidence about the benefits of
diversity in specific job contexts. For example, one recent analysis
concluded that gender diversity might also help reduce excessive risk
taking among financial institutions.326 Relatedly, numerous articles
have documented the value of having diverse writers’ rooms in
Hollywood, in terms of leading to more interesting, realistic, and
original scripts.327
By contrast, the aesthetic appeal preference and the Englishspeaking environment preference typically do not implicate the actual
exchange of goods or services for which customers came. They are
largely tangential to actual job performance. Some customers
certainly may prefer that employees adhere to common appearance
conventions or speak English to one another whenever the customer
can hear them. But those are atmospheric preferences that are
separable from how the employee actually performs his or her job
responsibilities vis-à-vis the customer. Indeed, these preferences often
appear in retail positions where the employee/customer interaction is
more limited and transactional in the first place.
Additionally, it is unclear that customers even care about these
atmospherics as much as employers think they do. Recall, for
instance, the Sephora case, where the court deferred to Sephora’s

325. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 21–22 (2005)
(asserting that, while some evidence indicates that diverse workgroups generate a broader
range of ideas early on in decision-making processes, diversity can also bring friction,
decreased workplace satisfaction, and increased absenteeism and turnover); Rhode, supra
note 286, at 1061–63.
326. Kristin N. Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve
Financial Firms’ Risk Oversight, 70 SMU L. REV. 327, 356–59 (2017); cf. Darren
Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More Than a Woman: Insights into Corporate
Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 890–92 (2015) (looking at
the related question of whether adding women to a board affects decision making, and
concluding that it may, primarily because they are more likely to be outsiders).
327. See Cara Buckley, Embracing Diversity, but Finding It Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2018, at A1 (“Having female or minority writers can have an enormous impact on
what goes onscreen. Stereotypes can be challenged and questions asked . . . [a]nd when
there is more than one woman or minority writer in the room, several writers said, they
are more likely to be heeded, and less likely to be called on as the voice of all women or
people of color.”); Bryn Elise Sandberg, TV Showrunners Talk Sexism in Writers Rooms,
Hiring Diverse Staff and Weinstein’s Blacklist, HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 9, 2018, 6:18 PM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/tv-showrunners-talk-sexism-writers-roomshiring-diverse-staff-weinsteins-blacklist-1118723 [https://perma.cc/ZBT5-Z5U6].

97 N.C. L. REV. 91 (2018)

158

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

belief that customers would be turned off by hearing employees
converse with each other in Spanish, without any actual evidence
supporting that view.328 Courts should heighten their skepticism here.
B.

Effect on Equal Employment Opportunity

In addition to considering whether the preference relates to
actual job performance, courts should also consider—when deciding
how much deference to accord—whether the preference, particularly
in the aggregate, is likely to limit equal employment opportunity.
Here, too, the aesthetic appeal and English-speaking environment
preferences raise the strongest concerns. Their burdens are not
equally distributed but instead fall hardest on women and minority
groups in ways that can prevent their equal thriving in the workplace.
Consider, for instance, Darlene Jespersen’s exit from her long-held
bartender position specifically because she was uncomfortable
wearing full makeup every day;329 Chastity Jones’s decision to quit her
job at Catastrophe Management Solutions rather than cut off her
dreadlocks;330 or the Camara court’s suggestion that an employee
should just transfer to a non-customer-contact position if she insisted
on continuing to wear a hijab.331 Neither the various aesthetic appeal
preferences nor the English-speaking environment preferences are
randomly distributed among a variety of looks, religions, or dialects.
Rather, they specifically reinforce majority default norms and burden
those who differ from them.
By contrast, the other four preferred preferences—along with
the diversity preference—do not operate in such a one-sided way.
Thus, they do not undermine equal employment opportunity to the
same extent. The physical and psychological same-sex privacy
preferences are symmetrical, with males preferring males and females
preferring females.332 Thus, they do not necessarily favor either sex—
as opposed to, for instance, the early BFOQ cases in which airlines
argued that everyone preferred a female flight attendant.333 The
preference not to receive proselytization or judgment, while indeed
burdening the small number of employees whose religion requires
328. See EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see
also supra text accompanying note 263.
329. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2006).
330. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1020–22 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g
denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017).
331. Camara v. Epps Air Serv., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1327–28 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
332. See discussion supra Sections II.B–C.
333. See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text.
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them to vocally proselytize or judge others, also works to ensure that
other customers and employees feel welcome in the workplace.
Recall, for instance, the Peterson case, in which the plaintiff-employee
posted anti-gay quotations that were visible to customers and
colleagues.334 By ruling in favor of the employer that had refused to
allow this,335 the court ensured that others would feel welcome in the
workplace. In that way, although the preference does limit
employment opportunities for some, it tends to ensure those
opportunities for many more. And the convenience preference largely
supports the privacy and nonproselytization/judgment preferences; it
does not impose an additional burden of its own.
Finally, the diversity preference—whose legal status is still
uncertain336—is the one preference explicitly aimed at promoting
equal employment opportunity in the workplace. That is certainly to
its credit. Even so, employers should not respond to this preference
merely by cobbling together teams on an ad hoc basis to meet
particular clients’ quantitative diversity preferences. Such an
approach is normatively undesirable for several reasons. Not only
does it suggest that diversity only matters when important clients
request it, but it can pit employees against each other for spots on
these high-profile matters, leading to resentment and discord.337 And
it is legally risky to respond to the preference in this way, given the
prevailing doctrine. As explained above, the diversity preference does
not fit neatly into any of the existing customer preference openings,
and it is not at all clear that courts will defer to it.
The best approach here is for employers to respond to the
growing diversity preference through mechanisms that are truly
geared toward promoting equal opportunity for all. This means not
just satisfying the diversity preference for the specific clients who
request it, but instead adopting broad workplace policies that are
aimed at making sure that all employees receive good opportunities
for professional development and can thrive in the workplace. Such
policies include close attention to the staffing of all matters (not only
in terms of the diversity of each client team but also in terms of
334. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 2004).
335. Id. at 608.
336. See supra Section II.G.
337. Cf. Buckley, supra note 327 (noting, in the context of television studios’ push for
more diverse writing staffs, that “some female and minority writers question whether they
are being courted because of a genuine push for diversity, or simply because male
showrunners want cover from criticism” and quoting a supervising producer from “The
Americans” as having “met white male writers who believe they were passed over because
a minority or women got their slot,” an attitude she described as “poisonous”).
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whether different employees are getting equivalent opportunities to
work on high-profile matters), plus initiatives like broadly available
part-time options and parental leave.
Not only is this approach more normatively consistent with equal
employment opportunity, but it is doctrinally safer. After all, the
more that employers adopt these measures as part of an overall
approach toward ensuring equal opportunity for each employee, the
harder it will be for any particular employee to show that he or she
was harmed by the way that the employer satisfied a specific client’s
diversity preferences. This will make it less likely for a court to find
that a materially adverse action and/or the deprivation of an
employment opportunity has occurred at all. By the same token, such
an approach makes the “equal burdens” doctrine—to the extent that
courts are inclined to adapt it to this context—an easier fit.
Additionally, adopting diverse staffing as part of a general policy
(rather than only in response to customers’ specific numerical
requests) betters the prospects for an affirmative action defense.
Finally, to the extent that such policies help employers continue to
diversify their employee pool, the more naturally employers can
satisfy their clients’ diversity preferences in the future without active
intervention. Thus, although these measures will require real time,
thought, and effort by employers, they are the best way to respond to
the growing diversity preference in the workplace.
CONCLUSION
The preferred preference hierarchy needs some reordering. The
first step is acknowledging that it exists at all and recognizing how it
works. This Article has sought to provide that contribution, showing
that each individual preferred preference is not just a one-off
exception to the supposed irrelevance of customer preferences but
part of a collective body of doctrine that operates according to its own
largely unarticulated principles.
By teasing out those principles and proposing to supplant them
with two more objective guideposts—whether the preference (1)
relates to actual job performance and (2) will limit equal employment
opportunity—this Article hopes to reshape the role of customer
preferences within employment discrimination law. In particular, this
Article argues that the English-only environment and aesthetic
appeal preferences do not warrant their respective statuses as strongly
preferred and moderately preferred. They are tangential to actual job
performance and they limit equal employment opportunity. The
presumption should be that these preferences do not deserve
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deference, and they should only be weakly preferred, if at all. By
contrast, the same-gender psychological comfort preference does not
deserve its current position at the bottom of the hierarchy, given its
relationship to the actual performance of certain jobs that implicate
therapeutic concerns and its symmetrical treatment of both sexes. It
should be moderately preferred rather than weakly preferred.
Additionally, although the diversity preference is markedly different
from the other preferences—given that it attempts to change, rather
than reaffirm, default norms—it too should receive some deference,
particularly when it is satisfied as part of an overall commitment to
equal employment opportunity.
In the end, the validity of a particular customer preference is
always going to be context specific, and it should be. But by keeping
the above guideposts in mind, courts can strike a better balance of
incorporating customer preferences into antidiscrimination law while
remaining true to its ultimate aims.

